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The Merchani, the Shoplifter and the Law
I. INTRODUCTION
Measured by several indices, shoplifting' would not be con-
sidered a major crime in America. Rarely does the offense result
in physical injury to victims of theft or to bystanders.2 Rarely
does a shoplifter steal enough merchandise per offense to sig-
nificantly harm the merchant.3 Rarely does a person make a
profession of shoplifting.4
Measured in terms of its total financial cost to the merchant
and to the public, however, shoplifting constitutes a major prob-
lem. Today, the value of goods stolen from merchants annually
is over $2 billion, more than double the loss resulting from
shoplifting in 1960.5 While the average value of goods stolen
per offense during this period has remained fairly constant,
the number of offenses committed annually has increased by
over 100 percent, 6 leading J. Edgar Hoover to term shoplift-
ing "the fastest growing larceny violation in the nation."7  The
consequences are disturbing. In 1967, at an international security
conference in Los Angeles, delegates were told that prices
charged to consumers are raised approximately ten percent by
merchants to compensate for shoplifting losses.8 To the mer-
chants themselves, many of whom operate at such a low profit
margin that they must sell $30 of merchandise to recoup a one
1. "Shoplifting" is generally defined as the taking of unpurchased
merchandise from a mercantile establishment with intent to convert such
merchandise to one's personal use. AP=. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 13-673 (Supp.
1970); Am STAT. AxN. § 41-3939 (1947). Some states, however, do not
require proof of intent. State v. Hales, 256 N.C. 27, 122 S.E.2d 768
(1961); N.C. GENq. STAT. § 14-72.1 (1969).
2. But cf. Radloff v. National Food Stores, Inc., 20 Wis. 2d 224,
123 N.W.2d 570 (1963).
3. See, e.g., R. CAVEN, CRnVNOLOGY 107 (3rd ed. 1962), reporting
that the average amount stolen per offense is $15.
4. W. McTeague, Shoplifting: The New Problem, in S. Cunns,
MODEm REAnm SEcuTrrY 80 (1960).
5. In 1967, according to Bus. WrEn, Dec. 23, 1967, at 20, and
NATrON'S Bus., June, 1967, at 44, 45, the value of goods taken by shop-
lifters was $2 billion. The UZrFORmo Cnn=n REPORTS 25 (1967) and 24
(1969) reveal that from 1967 to 1969 the number of shoplifting offenses
per 100,000 population increased significantly while the value of the
goods taken per offense remained constant. Therefore, in 1969, the
total value of goods taken by shoplifters far exceeded $2 billion.
6. UiNFoRPt Civm REPORTS 24 (1969).
7. Bus. WEk, supra note 5, at 20.
8. GooD HOuSEKEEPING, Oct., 1967, at 157.
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dollar loss from theft,' the results of shoplifting are often fatal.10
Yet, despite the magnitude of shoplifting, few offenders are
apprehended 1 and the number of suspects actually prosecuted is
negligible. 1 2 There appear to be three reasons for this inaction.
First, few offenses are observed.13 Second, even if a shoplifter is
detected, many merchants are unwilling to take the time and ex-
pense necessary to prosecute.' 4 Finally, even the merchant who
would otherwise apprehend and prosecute suspects is frequently
reluctant to do so for fear of subjecting himself to a countersuit
for slander, assault and battery, false arrest or false imprison-
ment.'
5
Recently, however, in an attempt to minimize losses from
shoplifting by increasing the rate of apprehension and prosecu-
tion of offenders, the merchants, their protection agencies, in-
surance companies and governmental officials have advocated
and implemented numerous changes. To increase the rate of de-
tection, convex mirrors, infra-red circuits, cameras, closed-cir-
cuit television and other expensive devices have been installed
in many stores, and additional store detectives have been em-
ployed. To increase the merchant's willingness to prosecute-
despite the effort and expense involved-several insurance com-
panies and retail executives have suggested prosecuting all of-
fenders detected, arguing that the costs of prosecution are far
outweighed by the deterrent effect such actions have upon future
shoplifters. 6 Finally, to decrease the merchant's fear of coun-
tersuit resulting from his apprehension and prosecution of sus-
pects, 25 states during the past ten years have enacted or amend-
ed laws intended to give the merchant greater immunity from
slander, assault and battery, false arrest and false imprisonment
than had been provided at common law.17
While some of these innovations have been effective, others
9. A. ALEXANDER, STEALING 78 (1969).
10. Shoplifting was one of the major reasons why John's Bargain
Stores, a 474-store chain which in 1966 sold $62 million merchandise
filed for bankruptcy in 1967. The estimated amount of pilferage
equalled ten percent of its total sales. Id. at 76; Bus. WEEK, supra
note 5, at 20.
11. S. CURTIS, MODERN RETAIL SEcuRiTY 95 (1960).
12. M. CAMERON, THE BOOSTER AND THE SNITCH 23 (1964).
13. Id.
14. LIFE, Dec. 15, 1967, at 72A.
15. R. CAVAN, supra note 3, at 21; S. CURTIS, supra note 11, at 128.
16. S. CURTIS, supra note 11, at 519-26.
17. Colo., Del., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., La., Mich., Mo., Neb.,
Nev., N.J., N.M., N.Y., Ohio, Okla., S.C., Tex., Vt., Wash., W. Va., Wis.,
Wy. For statutory provisions see note 63 infra.
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have not significantly benefited the merchant. The use of the
new devices, and the additional detectives have, of course, im-
proved the rate of detection of offenders. Nevertheless, the rates
of apprehension and arrest have not significantly increased,",
indicating the continued reluctance of retailers to confront the
detected suspect. While it would be expected that the merchant
has now become aware of the possible deterrent value of in-
creased efforts to apprehend and prosecute, the fear of counter-
suit still discourages him from doing so.19 The reason for such
continuing fear is apparently three-fold.
First, most merchants are not aware of the state laws affect-
ing their rights to accuse, apprehend and arrest suspected shop-
lifters.20 The books and pamphlets which detail for them meth-
ods for improving detection of shoplifters are virtually silent
with respect to the law as it relates to the confrontation of sus-
pects, limiting discussions of that problem to such statements as
the following: " [T] he problem of countersuit is even greater...
than with employee theft .... Therefore, before you take any
action regarding a suspected shoplifter, you must consult your
attorney and your protective agency." 21 The one source which
does list the applicable laws was published in 1960.22 Since that
time, 13 states have enacted new statutes directly pertaining
to the merchant's immunity from civil liability for accusation,
detention and arrest,23 and 12 states have amended, repealed or
reenacted their existing legislation.2 4 If the merchant had knowl-
edge of these laws, he would know what steps .he could take
with impunity and would pursue them. Without such knowl-
edge, however, he is reluctant to detain the suspect in any man-
ner whatsoever.2 5
Second, even if the merchant knows of the existence and con-
18. One store manager estimates that for every shoplifter appre-
hended, 59 escape. Lirs, supra note 14, at 72A. Only from ten to 35
percent of those apprehended are prosecuted. M. CAMERoN, supra note
12, at 24.
19. Interview with the representative of a large chain store, Au-
gust 15, 1970.
20. Id.
21. A. ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 84, 85.
22. Comment, Legislation-Survey and Analysis of Criminal and
Tort Aspects of Shoplifting Statutes, 58 MicH. L. RE,. 429 (1960).
23. Colo., Del., Ind., Iowa, Mo., Nev., N.J., N.Y., S.C., Vt., W. Va.,
Wis. & Wy. For statutory provisions see note 63 infra.
24. l., Kan., Ky., La., Md., Mich., Neb., N.M., Ohio, Okla., Tex.
& Wash. For statutory provisions see note 63 infra.




tent of all shoplifting laws applicable to him, he is often still un-
able to ascertain their meaning. The Colorado Supreme Court
has stated in interpreting its shoplifting legislation: "At the out-
set we readily concede that the statute is certainly not a model of
clarity and that it is ambiguous. '26 The Colorado statute is not
atypical in this respect. Most of the legislation is capable of be-
ing interpreted in numerous ways, such that the merchant is still
unable to determine just what his rights are. Although the con-
struction of such statutes by the courts helps to clarify their
meaning, few courts to date have been involved in decisions re-
garding these statutes because most of the legislation is of recent
origin and most cases are settled before ever reaching the courts.
Therefore, even the knowledgeable merchant is often uncertain
of his legal rights.
Third, even if the merchant were aware of the relevant law
and its application to him, he would still restrict his efforts to
protect his property from shoplifters in order to avoid liability.
That is, throughout the 50 states, both common and statutory
law-although providing merchants with some immunity from
countersuit-still severely limit their rights to accuse, apprehend,
and arrest suspects. Such restrictions are based upon the ra-
tionale that the rights of the customer to maintain his personal
dignity and reputation and his physical well-being outweigh
the property rights of the merchant, notwithstanding the pres-
ent incidence of shoplifting violations. In J.C. Penney Co. v.
Cox, 27 the Mississippi Supreme Court balanced the customer's
personal rights with the retailer's rights to detain a customer
upon meager evidence that the suspect had stolen his goods and
concluded:
Shoplifting is not uncommon in the merchandising field,
and some rules and regulations must exist for the protection of
the merchant; public policy makes it necessary to provide for
the protection of merchants against shoplifting .... The pro-
tection of merchants from shoplifters [however] would not
under any circumstances be justification for the usurpation of
the rights and freedoms of the individual citizens of this state
and country. The evils of shoplifting are probably great in
this country at this time. [Yet], taking care of the interests of
the merchants would not justify giving them complete power
and authority to infringe upon the rights of their customers
and allow the merchants, without regard to the feelings of the
customers, to require them to submit to certain humiliations
and disgrace of being indiscriminately accused of stealing or to
26. J.S. Dillon & Sons Stores Co. v. Carrington, - Colo. -, 455
P.2d 201, 203 (1969).
27. 246 Miss. 1, 148 So. 2d 679 (1963).
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be subjected to search upon the mere whim of the merchant or
his employees. 28
In Davis v. Mississipp, 29 in which the police interrogated sus-
pects merely because they were similar in appearance to an of-
fender, the United States Supreme Court noted:
Investigatory seizures would subject unlimited numbers of in-
nocent persons to the harassment and ignominy incident to in-
voluntary detention. Nothing is more clear than that the
Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions
upon the personal security of our citizenry .... 30
Although the fourth amendment is of questionable applicability
in cases in which a private merchant rather than a policeman de-
tains a suspect, it obviously will matter very little to a suspected
person's dignity whether his detention and interrogation is ac-
complished by a merchant or a policeman.
Therefore, even the recent shoplifting statutes, although
often enacted as "emergency legislation"31 and frequently hailed
as solutions to the shoplifting problem by merchants, are not in-
tended to-and do not-significantly increase the merchant'simmunity from liability. In fact, numerous lawsuits tried under
these statutes have still resulted in substantial recoveries by ac-
cused, detained or arrested suspects.32 In many respects this is a
fortunate result since it prevents the wholesale violation of the
customer's freedom from indignity and physical abuse. Yet,
many of these statutes and the common law rules could be re-
formed to maintain or even increase the personal liberty of the
customer while allowing the merchant a greater opportunity to
recover his goods and to prosecute suspects who are actually
guilty of shoplifting. This conclusion becomes apparent from an
examination of how present shoplifting legislation and case law
vary from the original common law in balancing the customer's
rights with the property interests of the retailer who accuses
the suspect of shoplifting, detains the suspect to search or to ques-
tion him without police intervention and who employs the po-
lice to aid him in recovering his goods or in prosecuting the cus-
tomer.
28. Id. at 11, 148 So. 2d at 684.
29. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
30. Id. at 726. The Davis case involves rape suspects rather than
alleged shoplifters, but the effect of investigatory seizures upon these
two types of suspects is similar.
31. Ind., NML, Okla. For statutory provisions see note 63 infra.
32. Southwest Drug Stores v. Garner, 195 So. 2d 837 (Miss. 1967)
($8000); Peak v. W.T. Grant Co., 386 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. App. 1964) ($6500);
JC, Penney Co. v. Cox, 246 Miss. 1, 148 So. 2d 679 (1963) ($2000).
1971]
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II. ACCUSING THE SUSPECT
Frequently a merchant approaches a customer upon or out-
side the premises and directly or indirectly accuses him of shop-
lifting. Sometimes such action is induced by the customer's sus-
picious appearance or actions, or because the retailer, an em-
ployee or another customer actually believes he has seen the sus-
pect taking goods. In other cases, it is simply the store's policy
randomly to accuse people of theft in order to deter prospective
shoplifters.3 3 In most of these cases customers immediately pre-
sent sales slips or otherwise prove their innocence. The merchant
then apologizes and takes no further action. He therefore risks
no liability for assault and battery or for false arrest and will
probably avoid liability for false imprisonment. However, such
brief confrontation could still subject the merchant to liability for
slander. To determine what the merchant can say under what
circumstances without risking such liability, it is necessary to ex-
amine first the elements of slander, and second the privileges
protecting the merchant from liability for slander at common law
and as affected by statute.
A. ELEMENTS OF SLANDER
In order for a person to recover for slander, three criteria
must be met. First, the words spoken must be reasonably and
fairly susceptible of a defamatory meaning.34 Second, the words
must be slanderous per se unless special damages are proved.36
Finally the words must be published.36
1. Defamatory Words
For words to be defamatory, they must expose their object to
public hatred, shame or ridicule in the eyes of "right-thinking"
people.3 7 The court generally determines whether the language
in question is capable of a defamatory meaning; 38 if it decides
that the language is susceptible of both a defamatory and a non-
defamatory interpretation, the jury determines which of the
33. Clark v. Kroger Co., 382 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1967).
34. Summers v. W.T. Grant Co., 178 F.2d 916, 917 (5th Cir. 1950).
35. Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N.Y. 54, 72 Am. Dec. 420 (1858).
36. Great Atl. & Pacific Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 647-48, 261
A.2d 731, 734-35 (1970).
37. Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, 262 N.Y. 99, 102, 186
N.E. 217, 218 (1933).




meanings would be attributed to it by persons of ordinary under-
standing under the circumstances.3 9 If the language is only capa-
ble of one meaning, the court decides whether or not it is de-
famatory.
40
Several courts, in deciding shoplifting cases, have been re-
quired to determine whether words spoken by a merchant to a
customer were defamatory under the above definition. While it
has been consistently held that direct accusations of shoplifting
are defamatory,41 more difficult problems are encountered when
the utterances merely carry some implication that the customer
is stealing merchandise. In most cases of this type, the words
have been ruled defamatory. 42 However, words which would be
regarded as perfectly innocent and non-accusatory in other cir-
cumstances are not usually considered slanderous by the courts
even though they seemingly constitute indirect accusations of
crime when uttered by a clerk to a customer.43
2. Actionable Per Se
Even if the words are defamatory, however, a person cannot
recover unless he proves either that damages to him actually re-
sulted from the defamation or shows that the words are action-
able per se-in which case damages are presumed and need not
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 261 A.2d 731
(1970); Gust v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 229 Mo. App. 371, 80 S.W.2d
286 (1935).
42. In Chretien v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 160 So. 2d 854 (La. App.
1964), defendant's manager had been informed by a customer that plain-
tiff had secreted merchandise in the plastic bag she was carrying. He
therefore approached plaintiff and asked her whether she was sure she
had paid for everything and whether she would like to pay for the
merchandise that was in her bag. The court ruled that such words
"were opprobrious and of an accusatory nature." In Roper v. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 164 A.2d 478 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1960), while a
young girl waited in line with her father at the checkout counter of
defendant's store, defendant's manager threw a package of gum in front
of them and said that he believed the girl would like to pay for the
package since she had "stuffed her pockets full of them back there at
the candy counter." Recovery was allowed because of the defamatory
nature of the utterances. Plaintiff's complaint in Camp v. Maddox,
93 Ga. App. 646, 92 S.E.2d 581 (1956) alleged that he made a purchase at
defendant's store and then left the premises. Defendant called the boy
back to the store and asked, 'What did you do with the mints? . ..
The mints you picked up in there." In denying the general demurrer to
the complaint, the court ruled that those words constituted indirect ac-
cusations of larceny and were therefore defamatory.
43. In Abner v. W.T. Grant Co., 110 Ga. App. 592, 139 S.E.2d 408
(1964), plaintiff inspected handbags at defendant's store but made no
19711
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be proved.44 Since an accused shoplifter is often unable to show
actual damages, it is usually necessary that he prove the words
were actionable per se if he is to prevail. While some courts have
ruled that "words which falsely charge a person with or impute
to him the commission of a crime for which he is liable to be
prosecuted and punished are actionable per se,"'45 most have held
that "only where the crime charged involves moral turpitude may
the oral accusation be said to be slanderous per se."' 40 Whatever
definition is used, any words directly or indirectly accusing the
suspect of shoplifting are actionable without proof of specific
damages. 47
3. Publication
Even if the words uttered do constitute accusations of crime,
recovery will still be denied if those utterances are not published.
Publication means that a third person-someone other than the
plaintiff-must hear the words and must understand them.48 If
the words are spoken in a language incomprehensible to the third
person, there is no publication. However, for purposes of publi-
cation, the third person may be a stranger, another employee or
even a friend or spouse.49 Moreover, most jurisdictions hold that
purchases. Upon leaving the store, defendant's agent tapped her on the
shoulder and asked her if she had bought anything in the store.
When she replied negatively, he asked "What about that bag in your
hand[?]" The court ruled that there was nothing opprobrious about the
agent's remarks and therefore dismissed the case. Plaintiff in Banks
v. Food Town, 98 So. 2d 719 (La. App. 1957) left defendant's store with-
out making a purchase. Defendant's employee followed plaintiff
and yelled only, "Hey, fellow!" The court decided that these words
alone did not amount to slander. In Summers v. W.T. Grant Co., 178
F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1950), plaintiff purchased a doll buggy from defendant
but left it at defendant's store. A few days later she returned, took the
buggy and walked out of the store. A clerk followed her and said:
"You will have to come back inside .... Everything that goes out of
this store that is paid for is wrapped." Nevertheless, the court ruled
that these words did not constitute an accusation of theft and therefore
were not slanderous.
44. Chretien v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 160 So. 2d 854 (La. App. 1964);
American Stores Co. v. Byrd, 229 Md. 5, 181 A.2d 333 (1962).
45. American Stores Co. v. Byrd, 229 Md. 5, 13, 181 A.2d 333, 337
(1962).
46. Sipp v. Coleman, 179 F. 997, 998 (D. N.J. 1910); Zayre of Vir-
ginia, Inc. v. Gowdy, 207 Va. 47, 147 S.E.2d 710 (1966).
47. Southwest Drug Stores v. Gowdy, 195 So. 2d 837 (Miss. 1967);
Zayre of Virginia, Inc. v. Gowdy, 207 Va. 47, 147 S.E.2d 710 (1966);
Chretien v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 160 So. 2d 854 (La. App. 1964).
48. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643. 647-48. 261 A.2d
731, 734-35 (1970).
49. Id. at 652-53, 261 A.2d at 737; Bonkowski v. Arlan's Dept. Store,
383 Mich. 90, 174 N.W.2d 765, 767 (1970).
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"where the alleged slanderous remarks are made under such cir-
cumstances that third persons present could have overheard the
remarks and understood them to refer to the plaintiff,"50 the jury
may infer that legal publication occurred even though no third
parties testify that they did, in fact, hear the conversation.
Since it is generally difficult to locate the customers who over-
heard the accusations, allowing such inference is extremely bene-
ficial to the plaintiff and detrimental to the merchant.
B. PIVIIEGES AGAINST SLANDER
1. Common Law
Even though a statement is defamatory, actionable per se
and published, the speaker's liability may be excused because of
common law privilege. There are two types of privilege-abso-
lute and qualified.. If an absolute privilege is proved, the com-
municant may not be held liable under any circumstances. 1
Truth, in most jurisdictions, raises an absolute privilege. 2 There-
fore, if a person actually is shoplifting, an accusation of theft by
the merchant will not subject him to liability. When the guilt of
the suspect cannot be established, however, the merchant's com-
mon law defenses are limited to the plea that an unabused, quali-
fied privilege was exercised.
A qualified privilege exists whenever a store owner or em-
ployee makes the statements in order to recover goods allegedly
stolen from him or to discharge any other legal or moral duty-
provided his words are uttered in good faith.53 The "good faith"
qualification is designed to achieve a balance between the rights
of the merchant to protect his goods and the rights of the custo-
mer to preserve his dignity and reputation. It is uncertain
exactly where the common law draws the line between the mer-
chant's right to accuse and the customer's dignatory interest,
since what constitutes "good faith" is disputed by the courts. A
few apparently feel that if the defendant or his agent "honestly
50. . Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 652, 261 A.2d
731, 737 (1970).
51. J.C. Penney Co. v. Cox, 246 Miss. 1, 7, 148 So. 2d 679, 682 (1963).
52. Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264 (1952). How-
ever, in Hutchins v. Page, 75 N.H. 215, 72 A. 689 (1909), the court ruled
that even a person publishing the truth is subject to liability for libel
or- slander if his communications are motivated by malice and M. Rv.
STAT. ANN., tit. 14, § 152 (1964) says that truth is only a defense if
the speaker had no "corrupt or malicious motives."




believes" that an offense has occurred, he is qualifiedly privi-
leged to accuse the suspect of committing it.54 Such a standard
seems ill-advised. It permits a merchant to damage the reputa-
tion of his customer on a hunch that the customer is stealing. The
more generally accepted rule holds that when a person is accused
of shoplifting, the defendant, in order to escape liability, must
show more than his honest belief based upon mere suspicion or
upon information supplied by an unidentified customer. In-
stead, the utterances must be based upon grounds which would
lead a reasonably prudent man to believe the party guilty of
the alleged misconduct. 55 Whichever definition is used, however,
the courts unanimously agree that the burden of proving the
facts necessary to sustain the claim of qualified privilege is
placed upon the defendant.50
Even if a qualified privilege is shown, it still may be abused
if the words are uttered with malice, if they do not relate to the
subject of the occasion or if they are unreasonably communi-
cated to uninterested parties. 57  In such cases the merchant
would be liable. Generally, however, the courts in shoplifting
cases deny the existence of malice even when the defendant's ac-
cusations have been uttered in a loud, crude manner.5 8 The rea-
soning is that normally the defendant or his agent does not know
the customer personally and therefore, would probably not be
acting purely out of malice.5 9 With respect to the relevancy of
the utterance, if the defendant merely accuses the suspect of
shoplifting, the statement is undoubtedly within the scope of the
privilege. Finally, while a few courts have held that "the fact
that the alleged slanderous words may have been uttered in the
presence and hearing of other persons who were accidentally
54. Southwest Drug Stores, Inc. v. Garner, 195 So. 2d 837, 840 (Miss.
1967).
55. Eason v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 219 So. 2d 516, 520 (La. App.
1969); Chretien v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 160 So. 2d 854, 856 (La. App.
1964); Banks v. Food Town, 98 So. 2d 719, 722 (La. App. 1957); Wil-
liams v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 337 Pa. 17, 10 A.2d 8 (1940).
56. Williams v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 337 Pa. 17, 10
A.2d 8 (1940).
57. Scott-Burr Stores Corp. v. Edgar, 181 Miss. 486, 503, 177
So. 766, 770 (1938); Gust v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 229 Mo. App.
371, 377, 80 S.W.2d 286, 290 (1935); Perry Brothers Variety Stores, Inc. v.
Layton, 119 Tex. 130, 140, 25 S.W.2d 310, 313 (1930).
58. Gust v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 229 Mo. App. 371, 377, 80
S.W.2d 286, 290 (1935); contra, Southwest Drug Stores v. Garner, 195
So. 2d 837, 840 (Miss. 1967).
59. Gust v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 229 Mo. App. 371, 377, 80
S.W.2d 286, 290 (1935); Butler v. Freyman, 216 Mo. App. 636, 642, 260
S.W. 523, 526 (1924).
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present and to whom the remarks were not addressed, would not
overthrow the qualifiedly privileged nature of the communica-
tion," 0 most have realized that even the accidental presence of
third persons causes the suspect as much humiliation as if the
merchant had invited the listeners to overhear the accusation.
These courts have concluded that "defamatory statements . . .
[lose] their privileged character. . . [if] made in a store open
to the general public in the presence and hearing of customers
who [are] there on the implied invitation of [defendant] and
who [have] no interest in the subject matter of the statements."0 1
In any case, once the qualified privilege is shown to exist, the




Forty states have now enacted legislation which ostensibly
increases the merchant's immunity from civil liability in situa-
tions where he confronts alleged shoplifters. 3 None of these stat-
utes have strengthened the common law defenses to slander,
with the result that even in these states, the merchant is not at
liberty freely to accuse.
The statutes, as they pertain to defenses against slander, fall
within two categories. First, the shoplifting legislation of two
60. Scott-Burr Stores Corp. v. Edgar, 181 Miss. 486, 503, 177 So.
766, 770 (1938).
61. Perry Bros. Variety Stores, Inc. v. Layton, 119 Tex. 130, 140,
25 S.W.2d 310, 313 (1930).
62. Holliday v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 256 F.2d 297, 303
(8th Cir. 1958); Ridgeway v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 290, 293
(D. Va. 1948).
63. ALA. CODE, tit. 14, § 334 (1958); ArIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-673
to -675 (Supp. 1970); ARK. STAT. AN. §§ 41-3939 to -3942 (1964); COLO-
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-5-28 to -32 (1963); Dmi. CODE ANw. tit. 11, § 644-
647 (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. AN. § 811.022 (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-
1005 (1968); IIL. ANN. STAT. ctL 38, § 10-3 (Smith-Hurd 1964), as amended,
(Supp. 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-3042 to -3047 (Supp. 1970); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 709.20-.24 (Supp. 1970); KAN. STAT. ANm. § 21-3424 (Supp.
1970); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 433-.234-.236 (1963), as amended, (Supp.
1968); LA. CmM. PRo. CODE ANN. art. 215 (West 1967); MAss. GENi. Lxws
ANN. ch. 231, § 94B (Supp. 1969); MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2917
(1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.366 (Supp. 1970); Miss. CODE ANN. §§
2374-01 to -04 (Supp. 1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.125 (Supp. 1970);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 64-212, 213 (1970); NES. REV. STAT. §§ 29-402.01-
.03 (1964); NEV. REv. STAT. § 598.030 (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 170-97
to -101 (Supp. 1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A16-19 to -22 (Supp. 1969);
N.Y. GEN . Bus. LAW § 218 (McKinney 1968); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-27
(1960); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.04.1 (Supp. 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, §§ 1341 (1958), as amended, Supp. 1969); 1342 (1958), 1343-1344
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states 4 is limited to statutes providing "that the merchant has
the right to request in a reasonable manner any person on his
premises to place and keep in view any merchandise which such
person has removed or which the merchant reasonably believes
he has removed from its place of display for any purpose." Yet,
unlike common law, the statutes do not authorize the merchant
to make direct accusations under any circumstances, nor may the
merchant question the suspect concerning where he obtained
the merchandise, or to request the production of a sales slip or of
other proof of purchase. While it is doubtful that these stat-
utes, where they have been enacted, have superseded the com-
mon law privileges, the adoption of such legislation is superflu-
ous, confounding the merchant who may attempt to understand
the applicable shoplifting statutes in this state.
The other 38 states have enacted general statutes pertaining
to the merchant's right to detain and to arrest suspected shop-
lifters. Fourteen of these states, although enumerating within
their respective statutes the privileges provided by those laws,
omit any reference to defense against slander. 6 Whether this
fact indicates that the statutes afford no protection against
slander is uncertain. In Chretian v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,00 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals of Louisiana ruled:
[T]he rights and qualified privilege granted by the statute
do not clothe the storekeeper with immunity when its manager
resorted to slander. The accusation of theft against plaintiff
made in the presence of other persons was at the risk of the
storekeeper if the suspicion of shoplifting proved baseless. 07
Even if other Louisiana courts and the courts of the other 13
states decide that their statutes were intended to protect against
slander, neither these statutes nor those of the other 24 states
expand the common law privilege. If anything, these statutes
limit the merchant's defenses. While it has previously been
(Supp. 1969); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 164.390-.392 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 4816.1 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1970); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-
359.1-.3 (1962), -359.4 (Supp. 1969); S.D. COMPILED LAWs ANN. § 22-37-24(1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-824 to -826 (Supp. 1970); TEX. PEN. CODE
ANN. art. 1436e (Supp. 1970); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-13-30 to -32 (Supp.
1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2566 (Supp. 1970); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.1-127 (1960); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.220 (Supp. 1970); W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 61-3A-1, -2, -4 (Supp. 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 943.50
(Supp. 1970); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-146.1-.3 (Supp. 1969).
64. Mont. & Vt. Nevada's general shoplifting statute also includes
a similar provision.
65. Ala., Ariz., Ark., Fla., Ga., Iowa, Kan., La., Mass., Minn.,
N.D., Pa., S.D. & Tenn.
66. 160 So. 2d 854 (La. App. 1964).
67. Id. at 856.
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noted that many courts hold that a qualified privilege exists at
common law whenever the merchant honestly believes that the
suspect is shoplifting, the statutes in question all provide either
that the belief must be based upon "reasonable grounds," ' reason-
able belief," or '"probable cause" or that the suspect must actu-
ally have shoplifted.68 Moreover, many of the statutes permit
the merchants to exercise the statutory privilege only when they
have confronted the suspects on the premises of their store or in
its immediate vicinity,69 while common law imposes no such limi-
tations upon the qualified privilege to defame.
It is questionable whether the statutes of these 38 states
were intended to limit liability from slander. More probably,
the purpose of the enactments was to increase the protection
of the merchant against liability for assault and battery and
false imprisonment, since in these areas the common law privi-
leges are severely restricted. As was stated in Simmons v. J. C.
Penney Co.,70 in which a merchant had merely confronted a cus-
tomer outside defendant's store and accused her of shoplifting
taking no further action:
[W]hile the actions of Mr. Brock might technically be
classified as a detention of Mrs. Simmons for purposes of ques-
tioning, we do not believe that this is the type of situation envi-
sioned by the [shoplifting] statute, but rather was a simple
inquiry made by Mr. Brock .... 71
Thus, even in those statutes where the privilege against slander
was specifically included, it was apparently added as an after-
thought without realizing that the privilege was provided just as
effectively by common law. Therefore, with respect to slander,
these statutes too are confusing and superfluous.
EEI. DETAINING THE SUSPECT
Merely approaching the suspect and accusing him of shoplift-
ing generally does not serve to recover the goods. Even if the
suspect is guilty, he will often deny the theft or perhaps will
simply attempt to leave the store without replying. In such cases
the suspect will escape if the merchant does not take further ac-
tion to detain him. If the retailer chooses to do nothing, the
goods will probably never be recovered.72 Yet, if the merchant
68. See notes 103-106 and accompanying text infra.
69. See notes 144-146 and accompanying text inftra.
70. 186 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 1966).
71. Id. at 362.
72. Once the suspect leaves the store it will be impossible to obtain
a warrant foi his .arrest or to search him or his property. Moreover,
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uses physical force to prevent the suspect's escape or if he de-
tains the customer through the expressed or implied threat of
force, he may subject himself to liability for assault, battery or
false imprisonment. Since the value of goods stolen per offense
is generally very small and the amount of recovery in actions for
personal trespass is often very large,73 the merchant is pre-
sented with a serious dilemma. If he is to recover his goods with-
out risking large financial loss in the courts, he must be aware
of the elements of these two torts and the common law and statu-
tory defenses against them.
A. ASSAULT AND BATTERY
1. Elements
In most cases in which a battery has been committed, an as-
sault has also occurred. A battery is any harmful or offensive
contact with the plaintiff which is caused by the defendant with
intent to bring about such contact or an apprehension thereof.7 4
An assault involves the same elements but there need be no
actual contact; it is sufficient if the actions of the defendant
created in the mind of the plaintiff "a well-founded fear of an
imminent battery, coupled with the [defendant's] apparent pres-
ent ability to effectuate the attempt, if not prevented." 75  In
shoplifting cases, the offensiveness of the contact and the actor's
intent are usually not at issue: when the suspect is restrained
from escaping or when he is searched, the contact is definitely
offensive and the merchant intended that it should be. Thus, the
merchant can only prevail if his conduct is privileged.
2. Privileges
a. Common Law
Common law recognizes two privileges whereby the mer-
chant can avoid liability for assault and battery. First, if the sus-
pect consents to the touching, the merchant is not liable.70 As a
matter of common sense this privilege would not apply when the
even if a warrant is secured, the suspect will probably have already
disposed of the stolen merchandise-the only incriminating evidence-
by the time he is searched.
73. See note 32 supra.
74. Baldinger v. Banks, 26 Misc. 2d 1086, 1087, 201 N.Y.S.2d 629,
631 (1960).
75. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hill, 25 Ala. App. 540, 542, 150 So.
709, 710 (1933).
76. Banks v. Food Town, 98 So. 2d 719, 722 (La. App. 1957).
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merchant seizes the plaintiff to prevent his escape: if the suspect
had consented to remain, there would have been no need to touch
him. Frequently, however, courts have held that a merchant's
search of a suspect was privileged nevertheless because the cus-
tomer consented to it either verbally or impliedly by his failure to
resist. 77 A second privilege sanctions the prompt use of rea-
sonable force to recover goods that have been taken from one
by force or fraud.78 This privilege, however, is far more limited
than the corresponding defense against slander, because in the
former case the suspect must actually have taken the goods
before the merchant can escape liability.
b. Changes in Common Law
With respect to most incidents of assault and battery, the
only privileges which may be exercised by the actors are those
which have long been acknowledged by common law. When the
merchant seizes or searches a suspected shoplifter, however, such
that his action may also constitute false imprisonment, the privi-
leges pertaining to this tort may also be invoked to escape lia-
bility for the assault and the battery. Of the 37 states with
general shoplifting statutes, 19 either explicitly state that a
merchant shall not be liable for any assault or battery com-
mitted while detaining a suspect in a reasonable manner if the
other statutory requirements (including reasonable grounds for
suspicion) are met, or else declare that a retailer shall not be lia-
ble in any way for a reasonable detention. 79 Though the other
18 statutes and the courts in common law jurisdictions have not
specifically authorized such a defense, it seems logical that it
would be permitted when the proper case arises.
In Burnaman v. J. C. Penney Co.,80 for instance, the Texas
court first construed its then-existing statute to provide a defense
against false imprisonment to the merchant who detains a person
in a reasonable manner if there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the suspect shoplifted. Plaintiffs also sought recovery on
an assault and battery claim. Although the statute did not spe-
cifically provide a defense against assault and battery and al-
though the common law privilege would not have protected the
77. Id.
78. Donnell v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 229 Ala. 320, 156 So. 844
(1934); Hodgeden v. Hubbard, 18 Vt. 504, 507, 46 Am Dec. 167, 168
(1847).
79. Del., Ind., Ky., Mich., Mont., Mo., N.J., N.M., N.Y., Ohio, Okla.,
Ore., S.C., Tex., Utah, Va., Wash., W. Va. & Wyo.
80. 181 F. Supp. 633, 635 (S.D. Tex. 1960).
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defendant (because the plaintiff did not actually steal any mer-
chandise), the court nevertheless dismissed the claim. The court
reasoned that "[s]ince a search would be a legal incident of the
detention or arrest under 325 [the shoplifting statute], the claim
for assault would fall within the claim for false imprisonment
since the two are interrelated."8' Since the search was author-
ized by the Texas shoplifting statute which provided protection
against false imprisonment, the court concluded that the assault
and battery charges arising from the search must also fail.
No other court has decided this issue. This is probably be-
cause, while most cases involving detention of a customer by a
merchant contain the elements necessary to establish assault and
battery, recoveries for batteries not physically injurious are typi-
cally only nominal: the plaintiff generally does not seek recov-
ery for these torts but rather claims only that he was falsely im-
prisoned.8 2 If, however, other courts interpret similar statutes in
the future they will likely adopt the Burnaman rule. Otherwise,
merchants in those states would be permitted to use reasonable
force to detain the suspect without fear of the false imprisonment
tort while remaining liable for assault and battery as a result of
using that very same force.
B. FALsE ImPRISONMENT
1. Elements
False imprisonment is generally defined as "[a]n act which
directly or indirectly is a legal cause of confinement of another
within boundaries fixed by the actor for any time, no matter how
short in duration. . . if the act is intended to confine the other or
a third person, and the other is conscious of the confinement, and
the confinement is not otherwise privileged. '83 Setting aside the
matter of privilege for the moment, three criteria must be met be-
fore a claim of false imprisonment can succeed. First, the plain-
tiff must actually have been confined; second, the actor must
have intended the confinement, and third, the plaintiff must
have been conscious of the restraint.
With respect to the first element, the presence of actual con-
finement exists only if the plaintiff is restrained "under such
81. Id. at 636.
82. See Isaiah v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 111 Ohio App. 537,
15 Ohio Ops. 2d 291, 174 N.E.2d 128 (1960); Collyer v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936).




circumstances as to lead a reasonably prudent person in the same
situation to believe that [he] could not escape if [he] wished.
... "4 It is not necessary that actual force be used to con-
fine the suspect. As the court stated in Hurst v. Montgomery
Ward & Co.,
False imprisonment consists of the direct restraint of per-
sonal liberty. There need not be actual force; the restraint may
be from the fear of force, as well as from force itself. Words
alone, - are frequently sufficient to bring about the actual re-
straint of liberty.8 5
In Hurst, the employee screamed that she would tear plaintiff's
clothes off and would have her arrested if she did not stand still.
A demurrer to plaintiffs charge of false imprisonment was de-
nied. In Stevens v. O'Neill,"8 a female store detective told
plaintiff she would have to be searched and then sent for a male
employee. The two employees then walked through the store
with the female suspect between them and led her to a back
room. On these facts, the appellate court affirmed the jury's
verdict for plaintiff, stating that the statements and actions of
the employees constituted "the exercise of such a dominion over
her that the jury might very properly find that restraint was
exercised....,,
However, submission to the mere verbal direction of another,
"unaccompanied by force or threats of any character, does not
constitute false imprisonment."88  In Grayson Variety Stores,
Inc. v. Shafjer,8 9 for example, where the employee told plain-
tiffs that they had better come back to the store, the necessary
restraint was held not to have been established. Likewise in
Lerner Shops of Nevada v. Matin,90 the court refused to find the
requisite restraint in the defendant's verbal request that plain-
tiffs accompany him back to the store.
Second, the merchant must have intended to cause such re-
straint. Intent is established when the merchanVs purpose is
to cause such restraint or if he knows with substantial certain-
ty ' that his actions will confine the suspect against his will. It
84. Titus v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 232 Mo. App. 987, 993,
123 S.W.2d 574, 578-79 (1938).
85. 145 S.W.2d 992, 995 (Mo. App. 1940).
86. 51 App. Div. 364, 64 N.Y.S. 663 (1900).
87. Id.at 365, 64N.Y.S. at 664.
88. Grayson Variety Store, Inc. v. Shaffer, 402 S.W.2d 424, 425(Ky. 1966).
89. Id.
90. 83 Nev. 75, 79, 423 P.2d 398, 401 (1967).
91. Garrett v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 202, 279 P.2d 1091, 1094(1955).
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is improbable that once restraint is shown to exist, the defendant
could prove that he did not intend it. Unless the defendant's
agent was of such low mentality or tender age that he did not
realize that his actions constituted a restraint, or unless he ac-
cidentally restrained the plaintiff-an unlikely occurrence-such
proof would be impossible.
Third, even if the plaintiff would have been unable to escape
at will and even if the defendant had intended to restrain him,
false imprisonment cannot be established unless the plaintiff is
aware of the restraint. In Harre v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,9 -
in which the defendant's employee kept the suspect in the store
until the police arrived by pretending to have his check verified,
the court concluded that the customer was not falsely impris-
oned, stating:
There is no liability for intentionally confining another un-
less that person knows of the confinement .... There is no
evidence in this case to prove that the plaintiff was conscious
of any restraint of his liberty or under the belief and impres-
sion that he was subject to the actual control or will of defend-
ants or any one else prior to the appearance of the officers at
the store office.93
In S. H. Kress & Co. v. Bradshaw,94 in which a clerk used other
delaying tactics to keep a customer in the store, the court simi-
larly dismissed the false imprisonment claim on the grounds that
Mrs. Bradshaw was not at the time conscious of the detention.
2. Privileges
a. Common Law
Common law originally admitted two privileges to false im-
prisonment. The first was the privilege to use reasonable force
promptly to recover goods that had been taken by another
through force or fraud. Although this defense was generally
pleaded in assault and battery cases, the few courts that decided
the issue ruled that the privilege could also be invoked to defend
against false imprisonment charges.95  The second privilege was
that if, under state law, the merchant would have been author-
ized to make or cause the suspect's arrest under the circum-
stances, he would also be protected if he detained the plaintiff
without resorting to the police or the courts. In Great Atlantic
92. 124 Mont. 295, 221 P.2d 428 (1950).
93. Id. at 655, 221 P.2d at 443.
94. 186 Okla. 588, 99 P.2d 508 (1940).




& Pacific Tea Co. v. Paul, the court explained that "[w]hatever
technical distinction there may be between an 'arrest' and a 'de-
tention' the test of whether legal jurisdiction existed in a particu-
lar case has been judged by the principles applicable to the law of
arrest."96 In most states, however, the arrest laws would not per-
mit the defendant to arrest a suspect unless he was actually
shoplifting.9 7 Therefore, the merchant would not be protected
against liability for false imprisonment even though the deten-
tion was based upon reasonable grounds. Such limitations re-
flected the common law view that no innocent person should
have to suffer the indignity of being involuntarily restrained
without there being a remedy against the person detaining him.
b. Changes in the Common Law
Maryland still follows the original common law doctrine s
and the situation in many other states is uncertain, but a majority
of the states have now expanded the merchant's immunity from
liability for false imprisonment. A few of these states have
modified the privilege judicially. The majority, however, have
expanded the defense by enacting shoplifting legislation.
In 1936, in Collyer v. Kress,99 the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia significantly modified the common law privilege. In a case
in which plaintiff was grabbed, searched and questioned in an
effort to recover the goods allegedly stolen, the court ruled:
In an efford (sic) to harmonize the individual right of lib-
erty with a reasonable protection to the person or property of
the defendant, it should be said that such a charge of false im-
prisonment where a defendant had probable cause to believe
that the plaintiff was about to injure defendant in his person
or property, even though such injury would constitute but a
misdemeanor, that probable cause is a defense, provided, of
course, that the detention was reasonable. 100
Exactly what constituted probable cause or reasonable deten-
tion was not detailed. Exactly how long the detention could last
was not explained. Whether a person could be detained outside
the premises was not discussed. Yet, the Coflyer decision did
definitely establish the principle that in certain circumstances a
96. Id. at 655, 261 A.2d at 738.
97. See notes 196-203 infra.
98. Great Alt. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 654-57, 261 A.2d
731, 738-39 (1970); Clark's Brooklyn Park, Inc. v. Hranicka, 246 Md. 178,
186, 227 A.2d 726, 730 (1967).
99. 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936).
100. Id. at 180-81, 54 P.2d at 23.
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merchant was privileged to detain a suspect even though that
suspect was later found innocent. This ruling instituted a wave
of similar decisions in California and other states,101 broken only
by occasional decisions which persistently continued to uphold
the original common law privilege.10 2
Despite this departure from the common law in Collyer,
many states during the past 20 years have codified this ex-
panded privilege originally adopted by their courts, and many
others-whose courts had previously followed the original com-
mon law doctrine-have enacted legislation modifying that doc-
trine to include the enlarged defense. Today, of the 38 states
which provide by statute for the detention of suspected shop-
lifters, 33 definitely protect the merchant from liability for
false imprisonment if there is "probable cause," "reasonable
cause" or "reasonable grounds" for believing an offense had
been committed even though, in fact, there had been no theft. 0 8
The language of the other five statutes is ambiguous, creating
some uncertainty whether the statutes are effective only when
the person is actually concealing with intent to convert, when-
ever he is concealing goods, or whenever the merchant has rea-
sonable or probable cause to believe the suspect is guilty. Never-
theless, the courts of Colorado10 4 and Mississippi0 0 have con-
strued their statutes to protect the merchant whenever "rea-
sonable grounds" or "probable cause" exist. The statutes of the
other three states, 0 6 however, unlike those of Colorado and Mis-
sissippi, do not mention "reasonable grounds" or "probable
cause." How the courts of those states will interpret their legis-
lation cannot now be ascertained.
Even though a majority of states have expanded the common
law privilege either judicially or by statute, the privilege remains
101. E.g., Lerner Shops of Nevada v. Marin, 83 Nev. 75, 423 P.2d 398
(1967); Moffatt v. Buffum's, Inc., 21 Cal. App. 2d 371, 69 P.2d 424 (1937);
Lindquist v. Friedman's, Inc., 366 Ill. 232, 8 N.E.2d 625 (1937).
102. Lester v. Albers Super Mkts., 61 Ohio L. Abs. 360, 361, 101
N.E.2d 731, 732 (1951); Jefferson Dry Goods v. Stoess, 304 Ky. 73, 78
199 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1947); Titus v. Montgomery Ward, 232 Mo. App.
987, 989, 123 S.W.2d 574, 577 (1938).
103. Ala., Ariz., Del., Fla., Ga., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., La., Mass.,
Minn., Mich., Mo., Neb., Nev., N.J., N.M., N.Y., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore.,
S.C., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Va., Wash., W. Va., Wis. & Wyo. The Michigan
statute provides that probable cause only protects a merchant from non-
compensatory damages. For statutory provisions see note 63 supra.
104. J.S. Dillon & Sons Stores Co. v. Carrington, - Colo. -, 455
P.2d 201, 203 (1969).
105. J.C. Penney Co. v. Cox, 246 Miss. 1, 148 So. 2d 679 (1963).
106. Ark., Pa. & S.D.
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subject to several limitations. In most states it is effective only
when: 1) the agent detaining the suspect has a certain degree of
belief in his guilt; 2) the detention is for a specified purpose; 3)
the restraint occurs in a limited area; 4) the detention is exercised
in a reasonable manner; 5) the suspect is held for a limited time,
and 6) the detention has occurred within a reasonable time after
the alleged theft has been committed. Other detentions will not
be privileged, and the merchant exceeding the narrow statutory
boundaries will therefore be liable for false imprisonment.
1. Belief in Suspect's Guilt
The states with expanded privileges against false imprison-
ment use various terms to describe the degree of belief in a sus-
pect's guilt that a merchant must possess before he may with
impunity detain the customer. Eighteen statutes adopt the Coll-
yer rule which states that "probable cause" to believe that the
suspect has committed or is committing a crime is sufficient.1 07
Six statutes require that there must be "reasonable cause" to be-
lieve the suspect guilty of the theft;108 six say there must be
"reasonable grounds"; 0 9 one requires "reasonable grounds or
probable cause" to exist;110 two state that there must be "good
faith and probable cause based on reasonable grounds";"2 one de-
clares that if a "man of reasonable prudence" would believe the
plaintiff was shoplifting, the detention is privileged, -"2 and one
requires "reasonable and probable grounds."" 3 Although some
courts have held that these various incantations have somewhat
different meanings when referring to the right of policemen to
make arrests, they have generally been regarded as equivalent
in determining the right of merchants to detain shoplifters. In
Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, the court stated that "for the
purpose of this opinion, we assume [probable cause] is equiva-
lent to 'reasonable belief' under 120A [of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts].""-' The court in J. C. Penney Co. v. Cox 15 con-
107. Ala., Del., Fla., IlL, Ind., Kan., Ky., Mich., Neb., Nev., N.J.,
N3VL, N.D., Okla., Ohio, Tenn. Va. & Wils. For statutory provisions see
note 63 supra.
108. Ariz., La., MAinn., Ore., S.C. & Wyo.
109. Iowa, Mass., N.Y., Tex, Wash. & W. Va.
110. Mo.
111. Colo. & Miss.
112. Ga.
113. Utah.
114. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 658, 261 A.2d
731, 740 (1970).
115. 246 Miss. 1, 10-11, 148 So. 2d 679, 683 (1963).
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tinuously interchanged the words, and in J. C. Penney Co. v.
O'Daniell,116 the court declared that "the test of probable cause is
whether defendant had reasonable ground for believing, from the
facts he knew or should have known, that the person detained
was engaged in the theft of his property."
In deciding these countersuits by suspected shoplifters,
courts have frequently been required to review the issues of who
has the burden of proving the existence of "probable cause," "rea-
sonable cause" or "reasonable grounds" and whether the trier
of fact or law should determine whether such grounds have been
established. Generally, it has been held that the burden of prov-
ing sufficient cause rests upon the defendant merchant. 117 With
respect to the second issue, "it is well settled that the presence or
absence of probable cause is to be determined by the court as a
matter of law and not by the jury as a question of fact"" 8 unless
the evidence is in conflict. 1 9 Even if the evidence is disputed,
however, it is the duty of the court to instruct the jury as to what
facts, if established, would constitute probable cause, and only
questions as to the existence of those facts are properly submitted
to them. 20
Since only five state statutes attempt to specify in any man-
ner the situations where probable cause or reasonable grounds
exist, 121 the courts are generally free to determine the applica-
bility of these statutes to specific cases. Judges have consist-
ently been reluctant to admit the existence of reasonable
grounds or probable cause because of the concern that the ex-
panded privilege will seriously impair the personal rights of both
116. 263 F.2d 849, 851 (10th Cir. 1959).
117. Butler v. W.E. Walker Stores, Inc., 222 So. 2d 128 (Miss. 1969);
J.C. Penney Co. v. Cox, 246 Miss. 1, 148 So. 2d 679 (1963); Isaiah v.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 111 Ohio App. 537, 15 Ohio Op. 2d 291, 174
N.E.2d 128 (1960). IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-3042 to -3047 (Supp. 1970) also
specifically casts this burden upon the defendant.
118. Gibson v. J.C. Penney Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 640, 644, 331
P.2d 1057, 1061 (1958).
119. Aitken v. White, 93 Cal. App. 2d 134, 141, 208 P.2d 788, 791
(1949).
120. Gibson v. J.C. Penney Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 640, 644, 331
P.2d 1057, 1061 (1968).
121. The Oklahoma statute provides that concealing merchandise is
conclusive of reasonable grounds. Missouri law states that willful con-
cealment constitutes reasonable grounds. The Massachusetts statute de-
clares that the concealment of unpurchased goods is sufficient while
New York and Washington provide that reasonable grounds shall in-
clude but not be limited to knowledge that the person has concealed




the innocent and the guilty customer. 22 They have therefore
held that a "reasonable belief" is more than an "honest belief"
based upon mere suspicion that a suspect is guilty'23 and have al-
lowed recovery because of a lack of reasonable grounds in cases
in which plaintiff merely placed his hand under his shirt and
walked off at a rapid pace,124 wore an army coat with bulging
pockets,-25 wore a scarf out of the store that had not been worn
when plaintiff entered even though there was no evidence that
the defendant sold scarves similar to the one plaintiff wore,'2 0
or happened to be in a department when an item was re-
ported missing.127 The courts have also denied the existence of
probable cause in situations in which another customer merely
reports his belief that the suspect has been shoplifting.'2 8 How-
ever, if the missing items are actually found upon the suspect
even though he is later acquitted of shoplifting,12 0 and if the em-
ployee reports having actually seen the items being concealed by
the plaintiff,130 or the suspect is wearing clothes previously pur-
chased from defendant with the tags still on them,' 3' courts
have generally found that the defendant's belief in the suspect's
guilt suffices to invoke the privilege. While there are some
situations then in which a merchant may detain an innocent
customer without subjecting himself to liability, the stringent in-
terpretation of the "reasonable grounds" standard by the court
has prevented the legal balance between personal rights and
property interests from shifting drastically in favor of the mer-
chant's right to recover his goods.
122. J.C. Penney Co. v. Cox, 246 Miss. 1, 11, 148 So. 2d 679, 684
(1963).
123. Id.; Butler v. W.E. Walker Stores, Inc., 222 So. 2d 128 (Miss.
1969).
124. Banks v. Food Town, 98 So. 2d 719 (La. App. 1957).
125. Isaiah v. Great AtM & Pac. Tea Co., 111 Ohio App. 537, 15 Ohio
Op. 2d 291, 174 N.E.2d 128 (1960).
126. Roberson v. J.C. Penney Co., 136 Cal. App. 2d 1, 288 P.2d
275 (1955).
127. Gust v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 229 Mo. App. 371, 80 S.W.2d
286 (1935).
128. J.C. Penney Co. v. Cox, 246 Miss. 1, 11, 148 So. 2d 679, 684(1963).
129. Delp v. Zapp's Drug & Variety Stores, 238 Ore. 538, 395 P.2d
137 (1964); Collyer v. S.H. Kress & Co., 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936).
130. Gibson v. J.C. Penney Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 640, 331 P.2d 1057
(1958).
131. In Clarks Brooklyn Park, Inc. v. Hranicka, 246 Md. 178, 227
A.2d 726 (1967), the court ruled that such circumstances did constitute
reasonable grounds. However, since Maryland has consistently fol-
lowed the pre-ColIyer doctrine concerning the privilege against false
imprisonment, the presence of reasonable grounds was not sufficient to
invoke the privilege but only to mitigate damages.
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2. Purpose of Detention
In Collyer v. Kress,132 the court held that a merchant could
detain only for the purpose of investigation, a limitation ac-
cepted by most of the courts which adopted Collyer's modifica-
tion of the common law privilege against false imprisonment.
Moreover, in 33 of the 38 states which through legislation now
authorize detention,183 that detention may only be for specified
purposes. Indiana and Oklahoma permit the widest scope of
detention. In Indiana, a person may be held in order to dis-
cover his identity, to determine whether merchandise is in his
possession and to inform interested parties. In Oklahoma, a mer-
chant may detain a suspect for the purpose of effecting a recov-
ery, searching the suspect and conducting an investigation. In
these states the merchant can undoubtedly question and search a
suspect whether or not the merchant believes that the suspect
still has the merchandise in his possession. In the other states,
however, in which the purpose is limited to "effecting a recov-
ery," investigating the circumstances of ownership or posses-
sion "questioning or interrogating concerning ownership" or
"detaining until the police arrive," it is more difficult to ascertain
exactly what the merchant can do with the detained suspect.
Such difficulty frequently prevents the merchant from doing
anything to recover his goods because of fear of liability.'
8 4
Thirteen statutes allow merchants to detain in order to effect
a recovery of their property.135 Such language apparently au-
thorizes a search of the suspects'31 and permits merchants to
question customers concerning their possession of merchandise.
However, the terminology, if narrowly interpreted, still severely
limits the merchant in two respects. First, if the suspect drops
the merchandise and runs from the store, the purpose of the mer-
chant's detaining him could not possibly be to effect a recovery
of the goods. Second, even if the merchant did momentarily de-
tain the suspect and the customer admitted the crime and re-
132. 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936).
133. The statutes of Arizona, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan and Virginia
do not specify the purposes for which detention is permitted. However,
the Iowa statute explicitly prohibits the merchant from searching the
suspect without his consent, unless a police officer directs the search.
For statutory provisions see note 63 supra.
134. Interview with the representative of a large chain store, Au-
gust 15, 1970.
135. Ala., Ark., Fla., Ky., Neb., Nev., N.J., N.M., N.D., Ohio, Pa.,
Tenn. & Utah. For statutory provisions see note 63 supra.
136. The Ohio statute, however, specifically prohibits a merchant
from searching a suspect.
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turned the goods, the statute would prohibit any further deten-
tion. Even if the retailer had not yet discovered the identity of
the suspect, he would be required to free him. Therefore, in the
states in which detention is limited only to effecting a recov-
ery,137 the expanded privilege may not significantly expand
common law. Yet, if the only concern of the legislatures in these
states is to allow merchants to recover their goods rather than to
punish offenders, such a statute is probably the best means of
balancing the merchant's property rights with the customer's
personal rights.
Eight states authorize the merchant to detain only to investi-
gate ownership or to question and investigate ownership.138 This
includes questioning the plaintiff concerning whether he posses-
ses the goods, where he got them and whether he paid for them.
Whether it permits the retailer to request the suspect to identify
himself, however, is uncertain. Moreover, it is difficult to ascer-
tain whether under such statutes, the store manager or owner
can search the suspect without exceeding his privilege. In Col-
yer, 39 when detention was authorized to investigate, and the
plaintiff was searched without his consent, the California Su-
preme Court still held that the detention was privileged.
Whether this interpretation will be followed by other courts is
not yet apparent. If it is not followed, the effect of the statute
will be to allow the merchant to embarrass the suspect and im-
pair his freedom by involuntary detention without permitting
the retailer to recover the goods in the suspect's possession with-
out the customer's consent. Since the only possible justification
for authorizing the involuntary restraint of the customer relates
to the protection of the merchant's property interest, denying the
merchant full opportunity to recover his goods after detaining
the suspect is certainly undesirable. If the legislatures are so
concerned with protecting a person's freedom from search-
which is understandable-they should not disturb the common
law balance between personal rights and property interests in
any way.
Six states provide that the merchant may detain to interro-
137. In Utah, however, detention can be for purposes of investigat-
ing the theft and for recovering goods, so even a narrow interpretation
of "effecting recovery" would not prevent a merchant from detaining a
suspect who had already disposed of the goods.
138. Ill., Kan., Mo., N.Y., S.C., Tex., Wash. & W. Va. For statutory
provisions see note 63 supra.
139. 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936).
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gate or to question concerning guilt or ownership. 140 It seems
evident that such statutes do not authorize a search without the
suspect's consent. No case, however, has yet decided this issue.
In Delaware, Minnesota, South Dakota and Wisconsin, a mer-
chant may detain for the sole purpose of delivering the suspect to
a law enforcement officer. This apparently indicates that he
may not question the suspect under any circumstances, that he
may not search the suspect and that he may not use any other
means of self-help to recover his goods. The rationale behind
the law is sound. It is easy for a merchant to overstep his statu-
tory authority and to abuse suspects physically or mentally, and
therefore, that authority should be narrowly defined. Yet in
some respects, the statute is undesirable. First, the merchant is
forced to turn the suspect over to the police in order to escape
liability for false imprisonment. Suppose the suspect is a child
who has only stolen a few cents worth of candy and who the mer-
chant feels is not likely to steal again: the action of delivering
him to the police may stigmatize the child, causing him un-
necessary harm. Only the Wisconsin statute avoids this unfortu-
nate possibility by providing that a minor need not be turned
over to the police but instead can be returned to his parent or
guardian. Second, if after momentary detention, the suspect pro-
duces a sales slip or otherwise proves he has bought the merchan-
dise in question or that he has taken no merchandise, the laws
require that he still be held until the police arrive in order for
the merchant's detention to be privileged. Such a requirement
is, of course, foolish. Moreover, detention after proof of inno-
cence is obviously detention in an unreasonable manner for an
unreasonable time. The privilege might thus be unavailable to
the retailer.
3. Area of Detention
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, after stating that a person
who reasonably believes that another has stolen his chattel may
detain the suspect, adds:
Thus far the cases which have recognized the privilege
stated in this Section have been concerned with a detention on
the premises of the actor. In the absence of sufficient author-
ity, the Caveat is intended to leave open the question whether
the privilege extends to the detention of one who has left the
premises but is still in their immediate vicinity, as, for ex-
ample, where the person suspected has gone out of the door of
140. Colo., La., Mass., Miss., Ore. & Wyo.
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a shop, and is half-way across the sidewalk on the way to his
car.141
Ten statutes specifically limit the area in which the detention
may occur. In Delaware, Louisiana and Nevada, the legislation
provides that the detention must occur upon the premises of the
merchant. Once the suspect has stepped outside the store, inter-
fering with him is apparently not within the merchant's statutory
privilege. Such a limitation is unduly restrictive since a mer-
chant stopping a customer who has just left the store deprives
that suspect of no more rights than if he had been detained
within the mercantile establishment. Moreover, since it is
difficult to prove intent to convert goods in a store with a central
checkout counter until the customer has passed that counter
without paying, a strict interpretation of these three statutes
would permit the merchant to apprehend the suspect only in
the narrow area between the checkout counter and the door.
Fortunately, the courts in these states will probably attempt
to broaden this restriction. For instance, the Louisiana Appel-
late Court in Simmons v. J. C. Penney Co. 14 2 in invoking the
statutory privilege to protect defendant reasoned as follows:
The fact that he [the defendant's agent] was only able to catch
up with her immediately outside the door to the store was
doubtless caused by Mrs. Simmons' proximity to the door at
the time she went through this suspicious series of motions, and
the distance which Mr. Brock was from the counter and the
door at the time he observed her making these motions. We
further believe that the sidewalk immediately in front of the
store, particularly that portion which was covered by the awn-
ing or roof extending out from the J.C. Penney Company store
building, could be properly classified as a part of the premises
of the defendant. 43
Five statutes require that the detention be made on the premises
or in the immediate vicinity thereof;144 one permits detention on
or near the premises 145 and finally, one law provides that the cus-
tomer be apprehended on the premises unless the merchant is in
"close pursuit."' 46  These provisions will probably be interpreted
to allow detention only within the general shopping area where
the store is located or perhaps the parking lot of the store. Al-
though the other statutes and the expanded common law doctrine
do not specify the authorized area of detention, cases decided
141. REsTAr- uNTm (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 120A, Caveat at 202 (1965).
142. 186 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 1966).
143. Id. at 362.






both prior and subsequent to the publication of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts indicate that detention will be permitted not
only upon the premises of the merchant but also in the immediate
vicinity thereof.14 7
4. Manner of Detention
All common law decisions adopting the expanded privilege
of detention, as well as 36 state statutes, 1" 8 require either
that the detention be made in a reasonable manner or without the
use of unreasonable force. Moreover, it is probable that courts
in the other two states14 9 with general shoplifting statutes would
rule that their legislation implies a similar limitation. While the
use of reasonable force'5 0 and the request that the suspect sign a
confession' 5 1 have been regarded as detention in a reasonable
manner, seizing a suspect and violently spinning him around
without first requesting him to stop, 5 2 or holding a suspect in-
communicado until he signed a confession' 5 3 have been held to
be sufficient to constitute abuses of the extended privilege sub-
jecting the merchant to liability.
5. Period of Detention
It is evident that the statutes and courts adopting the ex-
panded privilege require that the suspect only be detained for a
limited time, even though five statutes do not explicitly list that
restriction. 5 4  The question then is to determine what consti-
tutes a permissible period of detention. Five statutes set a spe-
cific limit. Under West Virginia law, the restraint may not ex-
ceed 30 minutes. In Indiana and Louisiana, the limit is one
hour.155 Finally, New York and Washington provide that the re-
147. See Bonkowski v. Arlan's Dept. Store, 383 Mich. 90, 174 N.W.2d
765 (1970); J.C. Penney Co. v. O'Daniell, 263 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1959).
148. Ala., Ark., Colo., Del., Fla., Ga., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., La.,
Mass., Mich., Minn., Miss., Mo., Neb., N.J., Nev., N.M., N.Y., N.D., Ohio,
Okla., Ore., Pa., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Wash., W. Va., Wis. & Wyo.
For statutory provisions see note 63 supra.
149. Ariz. & Va.
150. Collyer v. S.H. Kress & Co., 5 Cal. 2d 175, 181, 54 P.2d 20, 24
(1936).
151. Id. at 182, 54 P.2d at 24.
152. Jefferson Stores, Inc. v. Caudell, 228 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1969).
153. Wilde v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 160 So.
2d 839 (La. App. 1964).
154. Ariz., Colo., Minn., Miss. & Va. For statutory provisions see
note 63 supra.
155. In Indiana, if the police arrive before the hour is up, the mer-
chant must terminate his detention of the suspect.
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striction may not exceed the time necessary for the customer to
make or to refuse to make a statement and for the merchant to
examine employees and store records in an attempt to determine
the ownership of such merchandise. In the other states, the limi-
tation is less certain, although a detention period of from 20
to 30 minutes has generally been regarded as reasonable.15 0
Which party bears the burden of proof on this issue is uncertain
because of the lack of litigation, although one court has held that
the burden rests with the plaintiff.157
6. Period Between Alleged Crime and Detention
The apparent purpose of the original common law privilege
to detain and of the expanded privilege developed by the courts
and legislatures was to permit the merchant to catch the suspect
while he still possessed the stolen goods, a purpose which could
not be attained by resorting to the lengthy legal process of ob-
taining a warrant. It was not, however, to permit merchants to
form vigilante groups to apprehend suspects months or years
after the alleged shoplifting occurred. Likewise, although most
of the statutes do not specifically limit the amount of time al-
lowable between the alleged offense and the detention, the courts
construing them undoubtedly will only allow merchants to in-
voke the privilege within minutes after the crime occurs. As the
court held in J. C. Penney Co. v. Cox:
The authorities hold that where a person has a reasonable
ground ... to believe another is stealing his property, as dis-
tinguished from those where the offense has been completed,
he is justified in detaining the suspect ... for a reasonable
length of time, for the purpose of an investigation.15 8
Therefore, under these statutes, a merchant cannot detain a cus-
tomer in his store simply because that customer allegedly shop-
lifted the last time he visited the merchant's establishment.
IV. ARRESTING THE SUSPECT
In many cases, the merchant does not want to use self-help
to recover goods, or he may have used it and found that it was
an unsuccessful means of regaining his merchandise, or he may
have found it successful but nevertheless desires to prosecute the
156. Cooke v. J.J. Newberry & Co., 96 N.J. Super. 9, 232 A.2d 425
(1967); Collyer v. S.L. Kress & Co., 5 Cal. 2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936).
157. Cooke v. J.J. Newberry & Co., 96 N.J. Super. 9, 232 A.2d 425
(1967).
158. 246 Miss. 1, 10, 148 So. 2d 679, 683 (1963) (emphasis added).
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offender. In these cases, the merchant will invoke the aid of the
police. Many retailers feel that if they simply hold the suspect
without questioning or searching him until the police arrive, or if
they simply direct the police to arrest the suspect without per-
sonally detaining him, there is no danger of their being civilly
liable. They are mistaken. The merchant may be liable both for
false imprisonment and false arrest.
Although the elements of false imprisonment have already
been detailed, the characteristics of false arrest and the differ-
ences between that tort and false imprisonment deserve consider-
ation. While the words are often used interchangeably (and in-
accurately) by courts and by legislatures, most courts recognize a
technical distinction between the two. While false imprisonment
occurs whenever one person restrains another with intent, false
arrest requires that the suspect actually be told he is under ar-
rest, that he actually be delivered to a judge or to the police, or
that the defendant's purpose is to take the suspect into the cus-
tody of the law.159 In McGlone v. Landreth, for instance, the
court held:
The testimony as it appears in the record does not establish an
arrest of plaintiff by the cab driver in the first instance. The
evidence does not show that the cab driver advised plaintiff
she was under arrest, or that she had violated the city ordi-
nance, and he did not take her before a magistrate or deliver
her to a peace officer. 160
Thus while every arrest is an imprisonment, with the requisite
elements of restraint and intent, an imprisonment does not neces-
sarily constitute an arrest.
There are two stages where a merchant may become liable
for false arrest by seeking the aid of the police. First, if a mer-
chant detains a suspect for the purpose of holding him until the
police arrive, he may be liable for that detention. Second, if the
police arrive at the merchant's request, the suspect may recover
from the retailer for any arrest made by the police-even if the
merchant has not himself touched, detained or even communi-
cated with the customer in any manner. The customer cannot re-
cover in either case if the merchant can show either that he did
not arrest the customer or procure the arrest, or that he was priv-
ileged to arrest the suspect.
159. Harrer v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 124 Mont. 295, 305, 221
P.2d 428, 433 (1950); McGlone v. Landreth, 200 Okla. 425, 195 P.2d 268
(1948).
160. 200 Okla. 425, 427, 195 P.2d 268, 270-71 (1948).
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A. ARRESTING THE SUSPECT OR PROCURING THE ARREST
1. By Detaining the Suspect until the Police Arrive
Even if the merchant merely holds the suspect against his
will for no other purpose than to deliver him to the police, he is
nevertheless subject to liability for false arrest. The restraint to-
gether with the intent to turn the customer over to the authori-
ties is sufficient to persuade the courts that an arrest has oc-
curred. Therefore, even if the police never arrive, or if they ar-
rive but refuse to detain the suspect for want of evidence, the
customer may still recover from the retailer for false arrest.
2. By Causing the Police to Make the Arrest
For a private citizen to be liable for an arrest made by a po-
liceman, he must, by affirmative action, persuasion or request,
have "procure [d] an unlawful arrest and detention of another." 10'
If, however, "he merely states to a peace officer his knowledge
of a supported offense and the officer makes the arrest entirely
upon his own judgment and discretion, the informer is not lia-
ble" 2 even if the information is inaccurate, ' 3 unless the in-
former is actually aware of the inaccuracy. 04 Although the
principle is easy to state, the distinction between causing an
arrest and simply laying the facts before the police is extremely
difficult to ascertain.
When the merchant actually aids in making the arrest
through the use of physical force or delaying tactics, he is gen-
erally regarded as having caused the arrest. For instance, in
S. H. Kress & Co. v. Bradshaw,10 5 in which an employee of the
defendant engaged the plaintiff in casual conversation until the
police arrived in order to keep her in the store, the court found
for the plaintiff. Although it held that defendant's detention of
the customer until the police arrived did not render her liable
for false imprisonment since the plaintiff was not aware of
the detention, the court found that the defendant was responsible
for the arrest and imprisonment by the police, since "a well-es-
tablished principle of law is that all who by direct act or indirect
procurement personally participate in, or proximately cause, the
false imprisonment or unlawful detention of another are liable
161. Jensen v. Barnett, 178 Neb. 429, 431, 134 N.W.2d 53, 55 (1965).
162. Id.
163. Davis v. Well Clothing Co., 367 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Mo. App. 1963);
Hoock v. S.S. Kresge, 230 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Mo. App. 1950).
164. Jensen v. Barnett, 178 Neb. 429, 432, 134 N.W.2d 53, 55 (1965).
165. 186 Okla. 588, 99 P.2d 508 (1940).
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therefore."' 16 In Harrer v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,' 0 7 in which
the clerk similarly detained the suspect in the store until the po-
lice arrived by pretending to have plaintiff's check validated, the
court held that "the evidence and the inferences fairly and rea-
sonably arising therefrom tended to show [that] the defendants
instigated, encouraged and by their acts participated in the ar-
rest."'1 68 The plaintiffs therefore were granted recovery for false
arrest. In Gerald v. Caterers, Inc.,10 9 the plaintiff was an em-
ployee of defendant. About the time he quit, defendant's super-
visor noted money missing from the cash register. He then
called the plaintiff and told him to come to the defendant's es-
tablishment to receive his check. The supervisor told the po-
lice that plaintiff would be coming and the police were there to
arrest him when he arrived. After his innocence was estab-
lished, plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for false ar-
rest. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff which was af-
firmed on appeal, with the appellate court stressing that "de-
fendant through its manager [told] plaintiff to come to the drive-
in to pick up a nonexistent check as a pretext to having him pres-
ent where he could be arrested, and arranged for the police to be
there.,'17o
Even if the merchant uses neither force nor delaying tactics,
and in fact does not touch the customer nor communicate with
him at all, he nevertheless may be liable if he actually instructs
the police to make the arrest. For instance, in McDermott v. W. T.
Grant Co.,17 ' a female clerk in defendant's store observed two
men across the street whom she felt were acting suspiciously.
She told the manager; the manager ran to a policeman and de-
clared: "I want that man locked up. He's one of the three men
who has been in my store and have stolen things." 72 The officer
arrested the suspect and took him to police headquarters. In a
subsequent suit for false arrest, the jury returned a verdict for
plaintiff and the court affirmed, stating that "it could have been
found that the defendant's manager actively instigated the ar-
rest and that he did not merely report the facts to the officer and
leave the results to the officer's judgment."' 78
166. Id. at 594, 99 P.2d at 514.
167. 124 Mont. 295, 221 P.2d 428 (1950).
168. Id. at 304, 221 P.2d at 433.
169. 382 S.W.2d 740 (Mo. App. 1964).
170. Id. at 744.
171. 313 Mass. 736, 49 N.E.2d 115 (1943).
172. Id. at 737, 49 N.E.2d at 116.
173. Id. at 738, 49 N.E.2d at 116.
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In most other cases, however, the merchant is rightly re-
garded by the courts as a citizen merely doing his duty of pre-
senting what he knows to the police and is not liable for false
imprisonment or arrest. To decide otherwise would be to de-
prive police of the informers they undoubtedly need to properly
go about their business. Even calling the police and later identi-
fying the suspect as the one who the defendant believes com-
mitted the crime is not usually regarded as sufficient to cause an
arrest. In Delp v. Zapp's Drug & Variety Stores,174 defendant
thought he saw plaintiff stealing dye from the store and called
the police. In the meantime, plaintiff left the store and some of
defendant's employees followed her. When the deputy sheriff
arrived at the store, the detective took him to where the other
employees were standing and pointed the plaintiff out to the of-
ficer. The court refused to hold defendant liable for the subse-
quent arrest. In Davis v. Weil Clothing Co.,1 7 5 defendant's floor
manager told police he had received a bogus check from the plain-
tiff and subsequently identified the plaintiff as the forger. The
officer asked him if he was sure the plaintiff was the criminal be-
cause if he was the officer would arrest him. The floor man-
ager affirmed the identification and the suspect was arrested.
The court subsequently dismissed the plaintiff's suit for false ar-
rest, stating: "We think that defendants' view is correct that
the evidence here, on identification of plaintiff as the man who
passed the bogus check, amounts only to the giving of informa-
tion to the police officer."'17
B. PRiV GEs
Even if the merchant detains the suspect to deliver him to
the police or provokes the police to make an arrest, he will not
be liable if he is privileged to take such action. In cases where
he is not protected, however, the merchant will be in a difficult
position. Even though he is privileged to detain a suspect in
order personally to recover his goods without police interven-
tion, he will not be able to seek the aid of legal authorities if the
customer during such detention denies his guilt. Moreover, a re-
tailer who apprehends a suspect whom he knows has shoplifted
several times will nevertheless be unable to prosecute him until
a warrant is obtained. By that time, the suspect-if he can be
located at all-probably will have disposed of the evidence.
174. 238 Ore. 538, 395 P.2d 137 (1964).
175. 367 S.W.2d 19 (Mo. App. 1963).
176. Id. at 24.
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While the privileges available to the retailer who detains the
suspect until the police arrive are obviously those granted by
law to the private citizen, there is some dispute concerning
whether those defenses or those granted to police officers are
applicable to merchants who merely cause arrests that are actu-
ally made by the police. A determination of that issue is vital
since in many states the officer has more freedom to arrest than
the citizen. 177 The weight of authority is apparently that only a
citizen's privileges may be invoked.178 In Harris v. Terminal
Railroad Association,179 the defendant instigated the arrest of the
plaintiff by police. The court ruled:
The officer would be absolved from any liability, if he had
reasonable grounds to suspect that a crime had been committed
by the plaintiff, even though it may afterwards turn out that
she was not guilty, but the only justification which the indi-
vidual or unofficial citizen could invoke, would be that the
party arrested is actually guilty.18
In Howell v. Viener,'8 ' it was held on similar facts that a citizen
"stands as if he had made the arrest himself." The court then
analyzed the Mississippi statute concerning the power of a private
person to make an arrest. The majority view with respect to this
issue is preferable. The main reason for giving the police more
liberty to arrest than the private person is apparently that the
police-because of their experience and knowledge of the law-
will exercise a more-informed discretion than an ordinary citi-
zen in deciding whether or not to make an arrest. Before a
court will rule that a citizen has actually caused an arrest,
he must actually have formulated the plan for making the arrest
or substituted his discretion for that of the police. Therefore, the
same rationale for restricting direct arrests by private persons
applies equally to limiting the rights of citizens to cause arrests
ultimately made by the police.
Even after resolving that issue, the exact privileges protect-
ing the merchant against liability for false arrest are still diffi-
cult to articulate because of the number of laws in each state
bearing upon the issue and because of the unclear language used
by most of the state legislatures in drafting the statutes and by
the courts in developing the common law principles. Before at-
177. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-403-404 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 431.005 (1962).
178. Contra, Haggard v. First Nat'l Bank, 72 N.D. 434, 8 N.W.2d 5
(1943).
179. 203 Mo. App. 324, 218 S.W. 686 (1920).
180. Id. at 332, 218 S.W. at 688.
181. 179 Miss. 872, 879, 176 So. 731, 732 (1937).
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tempting to clarify the nature of these privileges, it is necessary
to determine whether shoplifting laws have given merchants
any special rights to make or cause the arrest of suspected shop-
lifters-rights which are available to them peculiarly, and which
are unavailable to other private citizens. If no such rights exist,
the merchant must then seek his power to arrest from the general
citizen's arrest laws.
1. Privileges Granted by Shoplifting Statutes
The shoplifting statutes in three states clearly give merchants
the right to arrest the suspect without being liable for false arrest
at either of the above stages-provided all the same conditions
necessary to avoid false imprisonment are met. In Ohio, the law
provides that a merchant may detain a suspect "in order to re-
cover [stolen] items without search or undue arrest or in order
to cause an arrest to be made by a police officer." In Georgia,
the defense is available to any owner, operator or employee who
"shall detain or arrest or cause to be detained or arrested any
person reasonably thought to be engaged in shoplifting." The
law in Utah immunizes from liability merchants who detain or
who cause arrests. The language of these statutes indicates that
the legislators in these states realized the distinctions between
detention without police aid and arrest through the intervention
of the police. They desired to authorize both, feeling that a mer-
chant with reasonable grounds to suspect that a customer is
guilty should not only be entitled to use methods of self-help to
recover his goods without being subject to liability, but should
also be authorized to employ police aid with impunity. In the
other 35 states with shoplifting statutes and in the common
law states, however, the import of this legislation upon the mer-
chant's right to arrest or cause an arrest is not nearly so certain.
Eighteen statutes, in addition to the common law doctrine,
permit the merchant to detain a suspect but fail to mention the
merchant's right to hold the customer until the police can be sum-
moned to make an arrest.1 82 Whether or not these statutes would
permit the retailer to invoke police aid while maintaining his
182. Ark., Colo., IlL, Iowa, Kan., Ky., La., Mass., Miss., Mo., N.M.,
N.Y., Ore., Pa-, S.C., Wash., W. Va. & Wyo. The New Mexico statute
however, permits the merchant to detain the suspect or to take him into
custody. No New Mexico court has interpreted this provision but the
reference to "detaining" and "taking into custody" as two separate acts
indicates that the legislature may have intended to allow merchants
both to use self-help methods and to seek the aid of the police and the
courts.
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statutory privilege has not been litigated in most of these states.
Indications are that courts will construe such laws as only pro-
tecting the merchant who uses self-help in an effort to retain or
regain possession of his goods.
For instance, the court in Cooke v. J. J. Newberry & Co.,188
was required to construe the New Jersey shoplifting statute.
The applicable provisions of that statute state:
A law enforcement officer, or special officer, or a mer-
chant, who has probable cause for believing that a person has
willfully concealed unpurchased merchandise and that he can
recover such merchandise by taking the person into custody,
may for the purpose of attempting to effect such recovery, take
the person into custody and detain him in a reasonable manner
for not more than a reasonable time. Such taking into custody
by a law enforcement officer, or special officer, or merchant
shall not render such law enforcement officer, special officer, or
merchant criminally or civilly liable in any manner or to any
extent whatsoever.
Any law enforcement officer may arrest without warrant
any person he has probable cause for believing has committed
the offense of shoplifting ....
A merchant who causes such arrest as provided for in this
section of a person for shoplifting shall not be criminally or
civilly liable in any manner or to any extent whatsoever where
the merchant has probable cause for believing that the person
arrested committed the crime of shoplifting. 84
The court noted that "the first paragraph of [the above statute]
deals only with the merchant's taking of the suspect into cus-
tody, and the custody spoken of in that paragraph is only for
the purpose of recovering the goods." It then explained that
"[t] he word arrest does not appear in that paragraph," and that
only the second and third paragraphs authorize calling the po-
lice. 185 The seventeen statutes in question, however, only con-
tain language comparable to that in the first paragraph of the
New Jersey legislation. If such language is interpreted in a man-
ner similar to that in which the first paragraph of the New Jer-
sey statute was construed, detention for purposes of summoning
the police and causing the police to make an arrest would not be
sanctioned by these statutes.
Other authorities support the reasoning of the New Jersey
court. The Restatement (Second) of Torts'"s says that the mer-
chant is privileged to detain "without arresting" any customer
who is reasonably suspected of shoplifting. This conclusion was
183. 96 N.J. Super. 9, 232 A.2d 425 (1967).
184. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 170-100 (Supp. 1970).
185. Cooke v. J.J. Newberry & Co., 96 N.J. Super. 9, 15, 232 A.2d
425, 428 (1967).
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 120A (1965).
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reinforced by the explanation that the common law "only permits
temporary detention on the premises and not the taking of the
other into custody." "If the actor purports to make an arrest,"
concluded the Restatement, "he is not privileged unless the cir-
cumstances fall within" the general citizen's arrest laws.187 It is
true that most of the statutes in question provide that detention
by the merchant gives him qualified immunity from "false im-
prisonment and false arrest," while the Restatement model and
the common law doctrine contain no mention of the torts against
which the law would be a defense. But the statutory use of the
words, "false arrest," is not apparently equivalent to the proper,
technical use of these words and is not designed to protect the
merchant who resorts to police aid. In Weyandt v. Mason's
Stores, Inc.,'8 8 the court was required to determine whether per-
sons acting under the Pennsylvania shoplifting statute 8 0 were
also acting "under color of law," such that the case could be tried
in federal district court as a "federal question." The applicable
portion of the statute provided:
Persons so concealing such goods may be detained, in a
reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of time, by a
peace officer or a merchant or a merchant's employe in order
that recovery of such goods may be effected. Such detention
by a peace officer, merchant, or a merchant's employe shall
not render [him] civilly or criminally liable for false arrest,
false imprisonment, or unlawful detention.1 00
Despite the language of the statute, the court ruled, "The per-
mitted action furthers purely private interests and the statute
designates such action as a 'detention' rather than arrest."10'
The statutes of sevenx other states either permit the merchant
to "cause an arrest" or declare that he shall not be liable for
"causing such an arrest." To determine whether the legislatures
of these states intended to permit the merchants to use their ex-
panded privilege to attain police protection or to limit the privi-
lege to the exercise of "self-help" techniques, the exact use of
these words in the statutes bears examination.
The New Jersey statute previously examined has been con-
strued to permit merchants to detain suspects until police arrive
and to direct the arrest of those suspects by the police without
187. Id. Comment d at 203.
188. 279 F. Supp. 283 (DJ).C. 1968).
189. Pa. STAT. AxzN. tit. 18, § 4816.1 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
190. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4816.1(b) (1963), as amended, (Supp.
1970).




subjecting themselves to false arrest if they act in a reasonable
manner based upon reasonable grounds. In Cooke v. J. J. New-
berry & Co.,1 92 the plaintiff was first detained and interrogated
by a security officer. When she refused to sign a confession, the
security officer called the police. When they arrived, he signed
a complaint. Subsequent to her acquittal, the plaintiff brought
suit for false arrest and false imprisonment. Her claims were
denied, based upon the following interpretation of the New Jer-
sey statute:
The second and third paragraphs of section 100 plainly
contemplate that after getting (or failing to get) the merchan-
dise, the merchant may (as often he should) call the police. If
he does, the section says (second paragraph) the responding
policeman may arrest without warrant on probable cause (i.e.,
on what he learns from the merchant) in which case (third
paragraph) the "merchant who causes such arrest as providedfor in this section, of a person for shoplifting shall not be crimi-
nally or civilly liable in any manner and to any extent whatso-
ever where the merchant has probable cause for believing that
the person arrested committed the offense of shoplifting."
Here Earabino took plaintiff into custody, and then decided
not to accept the stretch pants or their price but to cause her to
be arrested. He had a legal right to do so. 193
Five'9 4 of the remaining six statutes providing for "causing ar-
rests" are nearly identical to each other and similar to the New
Jersey statute except that their third paragraphs state:
A merchant or merchant's employee who causes such arrest
as provided for in subsection 1 [Paragraph 1) of a person for
larceny of goods held for sale shall not be criminally or civilly
liable for false arrest or false imprisonment where the mer-
chant or merchant's employee has probable cause for believing
that the person arrested committed larceny of goods held for
sale.
The difference is that paragraph three does not pertain at all to
paragraph two but only to a merchant who causes such arrest as
provided for in paragraph one. Paragraph one, however, permits
one to detain only to effect a recovery, and says nothing about
granting the merchant the right to detain a person until the po-
lice arrive, or ordering the peace officer to make an arrest.
"Causing an arrest" is therefore regarded by the legislature as
equivalent to "causing a detention" and thus seemingly does not
authorize the merchant to invoke the aid of the police.
Virginia also authorizes a person to "cause an arrest." Its
192. 96 N.J. Super. 9, 232 A.2d 425 (1967).
193. Id. at 15, 232 A.2d at 428.




statute provides that a merchant who causes the arrest of a shop-
lifter shall not be civilly liable if he causes such arrest on the
premises or in close pursuit. Again, the words are apparently
used as a substitute for the word, "detention." There is no men-
tion of using the police or of a distinction between detaining and
arresting. How the Virginia courts would construe the statute
in the case of an actual arrest, however, cannot now be deter-
mined.
As was previously noted, four states-Minnesota, Delaware,
South Dakota and Wisconsin-provide that a suspect may be de-
tained by the merchant solely for the purpose of summoning a
law enforcement officer. These statutes do not explicitly state
that the merchant will also be protected against false arrest for
the subsequent arrest and detention, if any, by the officer that is
summoned. However, such protection can probably be inferred.
That is, any time the police are summoned at the request of the
merchant, the merchant detains the suspect until their arrival,
and an arrest is subsequently made, the merchant would prob-
ably be deemed to have taken sufficient action to have caused
the arrest by the police. Therefore, the merchant is actually di-
recting the arrest rather than leaving the decision to the police.
It is difficult to believe that legislatures intended to protect the
merchant from liability for false arrest for his personal deten-
tion until the police arrive and yet subject him to liability for the
subsequent actions of the police. In fact, the Minnesota and
South Dakota statutes specifically state that when the officer
arrives, a charge must be made by the merchant if he is to en-
joy statutory immunity from liability.
Indiana, Nevada, Oklahoma and Texas provide some protec-
tion for the merchant who seeks police aid although the exact ef-
fect of the statutes is uncertain. The Indiana, Oklahoma and Ne-
vada laws permit merchants to detain in order to inform the po-
lice or other law enforcement officials of the facts relevant to
such detention. Provided that merchants in these states do not
actually instruct the police to make an arrest and do not take part
in the arrest except to hold the suspect until the police arrive and
then to inform them of the facts, the merchant appears to be pro-
tected from liability for the policeman's action. The third section
of the Texas shoplifting statute merely provides that a merchant
may detain a shoplifter for the purpose of investigating owner-
ship. However, section two states that "all persons have a right
to prevent the consequences of shoplifting by seizing any goods
and bringing them, with the supposed offender, if he can be
1971]
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taken, before a magistrate for examination or delivering the same
to a peace officer for that purpose." This section apparently pro-
tects the merchant from liability at both stages, assuming the ar-
rested customer actually has the goods in his possession.
Finally, the laws of Arizona and Michigan state that the mer-
chant is protected against liability in any action brought by an
alleged shoplifter. Such a sweeping privilege would apparently
include the defense against liability for using the police, although
it is not certain that the legislatures of these states desired to ex-
tend the privilege beyond the use of self-help methods of deten-
tion.
2. Arrest Privileges Apart from the Shoplifting Statutes
In New Jersey, Georgia, Ohio and Utah, the merchant who
acts reasonably in seeking police aid is immune from liability for
false arrest at either stage. In the other states with shoplifting
statutes, and in the common law states, the application of the
shoplifting laws in these situations is not certain. These latter
statutes, therefore, confuse the merchant who does not know
whether he may call the police or not. Adding to the confusion
is the fact that even if the shoplifting statutes do not authorize
merchants to make or cause arrests, such power may be derived
from the general citizen's arrest laws.
At common law, a merchant may arrest a suspect without
a warrant only for a misdemeanor amounting to a breach of the
peace that was actually committed by the suspect in the retailer's
presence or for a felony actually committed, if the merchant
had reasonable grounds to believe the suspect committed it.' 9
In the 18 states still following the common law doctrine,", if
the crime is a misdemeanor not amounting to a breach of peace,
the suspect can recover for false arrest even if he is found guilty
of the crime. Moreover, even if the offense constitutes a breach
of the peace, it must still have been committed by the suspect
in the arrestor's presence. Therefore, if a customer or an em-
ployee reported the shoplifting to the store manager, and the
manager detained the suspect for delivery to the police or caused
the arrest by the police, the manager would be liable. Finally,
even if the citizen had reasonable grounds to believe that the
suspect had committed a felony, that citizen would still be liable
195. Moll v. United States, 413 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1969).
196. Conn., Del., Fla., Me., Md., Mass., Mo., N.H., N.J., N.M., Pa.,
R.I., Vt., Va., Wash., W. Va. & Wis.
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if no felony had in fact, been committed. Such a doctrine was de-
signed to insure that any person suspected of a minor offense
would not be subjected to physical abuse and indignity by a
private person since the courts felt that even if he were guilty
of the offense, his personal rights were more important than the
interests of the state in punishing a person committing such
offense.
Even in the 32 states with citizen's arrest statutes, the
arrest powers are restricted. In five states,19 7 the citizen is not
authorized to make an arrest for any misdemeanor and two
permit only arrests for misdemeanors when they constitute
breaches of the peace.198  Of the others, 20 require that the
suspect must have actually committed an offense in the arrestor's
presence; 199 two permit arrests when petit larceny has been com-
mitted and where there are reasonable grounds to believe the sus-
pect guilty of the offense;200 one allows arrests when the arrestor
has reasonable grounds to believe the crime has been committed
in his presence;201 one authorizes the arrests where the offense
has been committed and there is a reasonable suspicion that the
person arrested committed it,202 and one allows such arrest on
reasonable grounds that any offense has been committed in or out
197. AiK. STAT. ANN. § 43-404 (1964); Ky. REv. STAT. § 431.005
(1963); LA. CnnwL PsO. CODE ANN. art. 214 (1967); MicL Cop". LAws
A_-. § 764-16 (1968); OHio REv. CODE§ 8 2935.04 (1954).
198. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-39, -40 (1965); TEN. CODE CanM Psoc.
art. 14.01 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1970). ARiz. REv. STrA. Am¢. § 13-
404 (1956), also explicitly provides that the misdemeanor must consti-
tute a breach of the peace. However, in State v. De Santi, 8 Ariz. App.
77, 80, 443 P.2d 439, 442 (1968), the court ruled that "a private person has
the right to place a thief under arrest without a warrant even in the
absence of a breach of the peace, and even though the offense be a petty
theft .... "
199. AirA. CODE tit. 15, § 158 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.030 (1962);
A=- REv. STAT. ANrw. § 13-1404 (1956) (See note 198 supra); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 837 (West 1970); COLO. P v. STAT. AN. § 39-2-20 (1963); GA. CODE
ANN. § 27-211 (1953); IDAHo CODE ANN. § 19-604 (1948); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 755.5 (1950); KAw. STAT. ANN. § 22-2403 (Supp. 1970); MnmN.
STAT. § 629.37 (1969); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2470 (1942), as amended, (Supp.
1968); NEv. REv. STAT. § 171.126 (1969); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 183(1958), as amended, (McKinney 1970); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-06-20
(1960); OQLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 202 (1969); OE REv. STAT. § 133.350 (1969);
S.C. CODE Axw. § 17-251 (1962); S.D. COMpILED LAws ANN. § 23-22-14
(1967); TEpN. CODE ANN. § 40-816 (1955), as amended, (Supp. 1970);
UTA CODE ANrr. § 77-13-4 (1953). In South Carolina, a private person
can only arrest for a misdemeanor when that misdemeanor constitutes
larceny.
200. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-402 (1964); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-156 (1957).
201. MozNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 95-611 (1969).
202. HAwAiI REV. STAT. §§ 708-3, -4 (1968).
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of his presence.2 0 3 In addition, a majority of the statutes permit
the arrestor more freedom if the crime allegedly committed con-
stitutes a felony than if it is a misdemeanor, even if the misde-
meanor constitutes a breach of the peace.
20 4
In most of these states, it is obviously important to determine
whether shoplifting constitutes a breach of the peace and
whether it is a felony or misdemeanor. The courts have gener-
ally held that the offense is not a breach of the peace. 20 5 As the
court ruled in the Paul case, "Breach of the peace signifies disor-
derly dangerous conduct disruptive of public peace and it is clear
that the usual shoplifting incident does not fit within this cate-
gory. ' 20 6 Therefore, in states permitting arrests only when mis-
demeanors constitute breaches of the peace, a merchant arresting
a suspect is liable for false arrest even if the suspect is found
guilty, unless the shoplifting statute otherwise provides. In
West Virginia, however, the shoplifting statute provides that "an
act of shoplifting as defined herein is hereby declared to consti-
tute a breach of the peace . . . ." In the 43 states where the
extent of the freedom of a private citizen may depend upon
whether the offense allegedly committed was a felony or a mis-
demeanor, 20 7 three statutes provide that all shoplifting offenses
203. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 107.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970).
204. Of the 22 statutes cited in notes 198 and 199 supra, which
provide that a private person can arrest a suspect only when he has
actually committed a felony or a misdemeanor amounting to a breach
of the peace in the presence of the private person, 18 also provide
that the private person can arrest a suspect when a felony has ac-
tually been committed, even though not in the citizen's presence, if
the citizen has reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect com-
mitted the offense. These states are Ala., Alas., Ariz., Cal., Ga., Idaho,
Iowa, Kan., Minn., Miss., Nev., N.D., Okla., Ore., S.C., S.D., Tenn. and
Utah. In North Carolina no private person can arrest a suspect for any
offense that was not committed in the citizen's presence, but a person
can arrest a suspect when a felony has actually been committed in his
presence and he has reasonable grounds to believe the suspect com-
mitted it, while he can only arrest a suspect who has actually com-
mitted a misdemeanor amounting to a breach of the peace. In New
York, the only difference between the privilege of a citizen to arrest a
person committing a felony or a misdemeanor is that the misdemeanor
must actually have been committed in his presence while the felony
could have been committed out of his presence. The statutes of
Colorado and Texas draw no distinctions between the two types of of-
fenses. For statutory provisions see notes 198 and 199 supra.
205. Radloff v. National Food Stores, 20 Wis. 2d 224, 123 N.W.2d
570 (1963).
206. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 655-56, 261
A.2d 731, 739 (1970).
207. In Georgia, Ohio and Utah, the shoplifting statutes definitely
permit merchants to make or cause arrests. See note 63 supra for statu-
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are felonies. 20 8 In ten states, the first offense is a misdemeanor,
no matter how much is stolen.20 9 In the other states, the value of
the goods stolen is determinative. 2 10 In three states, thefts ex-
ceeding $20 constitute felonies2 11 while two other states set the
figure at $25.212 In six states shoplifting is only a felony if the
value of the goods stolen is over $50.213 In Washington, taking
tory provisions. In New Jersey the shoplifting statute has been inter-
preted by the courts to also authorize arrests by merchants. See note
185 supra. In Hawaii and Illinois arrests by private citizens based
upon reasonable grounds to believe the suspect was committing an of-
fense are permissible whether that offense constitutes a felony or a mis-
demeanor. See notes 202 and 203 supra. In Colorado one can only ar-
rest when either a felony or a misdemeanor is committed in his pres-
ence. See note 199 supra.
208. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-101 (1956), 10-3039 (Supp. 1970); Mxcu.
ComP. LAWS ANN. § 750.360 (1968); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 161.030, 164.390
(1969).
209. ALASKA STAT. § 11.20.275 (1970); AIs. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-673
(Supp. 1970); Anm STAT. .ANr. §§ 41-103, -3939 (1964); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 18-4626 (Supp. 1969); KY. REv. STAT. §§ 431.060 (1962), 433.234 (Supp.
1968); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3501 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
72.1 (1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-41-20 (1969); S.D. COraP1LED LAWS
ANN. §§ 22-1-4 (1962), 22-37-20 (1967); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-146.4
(Supp. 1969).
210. In four states, it is not certain whether shoplifting is a felony or
a misdemeanor because of ambiguities in the statutes. N.KL REv. STAT.
ANN. § 594.1 (1955), as amended, (Supp. 1970) defines "felony" as an of-
fense punishable by death or imprisonment in a state prison. N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 582.15 (Supp. 1970) states that persons convicted of shop-
lifting shall be imprisoned up to six months but does not say where
such incarceration shall occur. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 943.20(3) & 939.60
(1968) present a similar problem. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4807 (1963)
states that anyone who commits larceny is guilty of a felony but tit 18,
§ 4816.1 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1970) creates the crime of shoplifting
and maximum sentences for that offense. Whether shoplifting is still
regarded as larceny cannot now be ascertained. S.C. Cons ANN. § 16-
11 (1962) names the specific offenses that constitute felonies and
includes grand larceny but excludes shoplifting, although under § 16-
359.1 (1962) the offense of shoplifting is created.
211. IowA CoDs ANN. §§ 687.2 (1950), 687.4 (1950), 709.20 (Supp.
1970); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:2(4) (1951), as amended, (Supp. 1970),
14:67 (1951), as amended, (Supp. 1970); ONLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 5, 1701,
1704-06 (1962).
212. ALA. CODE tit. 1, § 7 (1960), tit. 14, § 331 (1959), as amended,
(Supp. 1969); Miss. COD ANN. § 2374.02 (Supp. 1968). ALA. COD tit.
14, § 331, however, sets the value of goods stolen for purposes of consti-
tuting larceny and felonies at $5 if the items are stolen from "shops or
storehouses." This may cover the shoplifting situation.
213. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-1 (1969), 53-63 (1960), as amended,
(Supp. 1970). KAN. STAT. AN. § 21-3701 (Supp. 1970); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 556.020 (1953), as amended, (Supp. 1970), 556.040 (1953), 560.056
(Supp. 1970), 560.061 (Supp. 1970); MONT. Rsv. CODES ANN. §§ 94-114,
-2704-07 (1969); TEx. PEN. COD ANN. art. 47 (1952), art. 1436e (Supp.
1970); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-3A-2, 61-3A-4 (Supp. 1970).
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less than $75 subjects one to prosecution for a misdemeanor 14
and 14 states set the dividing line at $100 or at a higher fig-
ure.210  Since the average amount stolen per offense is approxi-
mately $15,210 most cases of shoplifting would thus be classified
as misdemeanors in most states. The merchant's freedom to ar-
rest or cause the arrest of suspected shoplifters in these states is
therefore severely limited. Even in most of those states in which
he can make arrests for misdemeanors not amounting to breaches
of the peace, the suspect must not only have actually been guilty
of the offense, but the person making the arrest must actually
have witnessed the violation.
That many of the shoplifting statutes and general citizen's
arrest laws only permit the merchant to detain the shoplifter but
not to have him arrested is unfortunate. To allow a merchant to
detain a suspect whom he knows has shoplifted without permit-
ting him to seek police aid if the customer refuses to return the
goods gives the retailer just enough power to subject the cus-
tomer to the indignity of involuntary detention without giving
him sufficient authority to recover his goods. To permit the mer-
chant to detain a frequent offender and convince him to return
the goods without authorizing that merchant to deliver the ad-
mitted criminal into custody of the law is even more undesirable.
Even if the legislators and the judges feel that the right of a
merchant to deliver a suspect to the police must be more severely
restricted than the merchant's right to detain the customer with-
out police intervention, because interrogation by the police is
more humiliating than questioning by the retailer, there is still
apparently no reason to prohibit the retailer from having the de-
tained suspect arrested if it should turn out that he actually is
guilty of the offense-whether or not the theft occurs in the mer-
chant's presence.
214. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.78.010 (Supp. 1970).
215. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17, 487-90 (West 1970); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, §§ 631 (1953), 644(b) (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.08
(1965), 811.021 (1965), as amended, (Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 551A (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1970); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 266,
§ 30 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1969), ch. 274, § 1 (1968); MINN. STAT.
§§ 609.02, 609.52 (1969); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-506, 28-512, 29-102 (1965);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 193.120, 205.220, 205.240 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-
16-20 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 155.25 (1967), 155.30 (1967), as
amended, (Supp. 1970); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-01-07, 12-40-03, -04, -05
(1960); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-103, -4204 (1955), 39-4235 (Supp. 1970);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1, 2501, 2502 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-
126.1 (Supp. 1970). The Minnesota statute provides, however, that the
values of items stolen over a six-month period must be aggregated to
determine whether more than $100 has been stolen.




As the rate of shoplifting legislation decreases and the
amount of literature concerning shoplifting proliferates, the mer-
chant will undoubtedly become more aware of the laws applicable
in the states in which he operates. As more and more courts be-
gin to interpret their state's shoplifting statutes or their common
law doctrines, the retailer will also be able to determine exactly
what these laws mean. With such increased understanding, he
will know what steps he can take within the law and he will
probably pursue them.
However, his freedom to accuse, detain and arrest will depend
primarily upon the protection granted by the legislatures and the
courts. He will, therefore, continue to present figures showing
the disturbing losses from theft and their effect upon him and
the consumer. In turn, the courts and the legislatures will con-
tinue to sympathize with the merchant and will desire "to assist
the store owner in reducing the mounting problem of loss from
shoplifting. 217  Yet, as in the past, the lawmakers will prob-
ably also realize that the suspected customer needs protection
too, and unfortunately, in an effort to balance these competing
interests, they will probably continue to allow merchants to take
enough action to injure the dignity and reputation of suspects
without permitting them sufficient means to recover their wares.
Therefore, it is unlikely that the common law privilege against
slander, unchanged by any statute to date, will be expanded by
future legislation. Moreover, while more states may expand the
common law defenses against assault, battery and false impris-
onment to protect the merchant who detains the innocent cus-
tomer when reasonable grounds for belief of guilt exist, that
privilege will also be severely limited. Courts will continue to be
reluctant to concede the existence of reasonable grounds in cases
before them, and the defense will probably still be limited to sit-
uations in which the suspect is detained in a reasonable manner
for a specified purpose for a reasonable time in the vicinity of the
store. Finally, while more states may allow the merchant to
make or cause arrests, others will continue to limit his privilege to
self-help efforts unless their general citizen's arrest statutes or
common law doctrines otherwise provide. Thus, the merchant's
right to regain his property and to prosecute offenders will re-
main--as it has always been-a narrowly restricted one.
217. Lerner Shops of Nevada v. Matin, 83 Nev. 75, 78-79, 423 P.2d
398, 400 (1967).
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